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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Tobias Albert Ten Eyck for the
Master of Science in Sociology presented August 12, 1994.

Title:

A Cross-national Study of Attitudes and Group

Labeling:

Multinational corporation (MNC) workers in

Canada, Brazil, and West Germany.

Many studies concerning multinational corporations
{MNCs) are replete with theoretical models and case studies
that treat MNCs as stand-alone entities.

Very little time

and effort is given to understanding the context in which
MNCs operate.

This context includes not only the fact that

MNCs transcend national boundaries (political as well as
geographical), but also the meaning of work and being part
of a multinational work force for those employed within
MNCs.

This thesis is an effort to elucidate how the

political/societal/cultural contexts of different host
countries affect the attitudes of those workers most
directly involved with foreign-owned MNCs.

By shifting the

focus from the MNC to the political/societal/cultural
environment of host countries, foreign-owned MNCs can be
compared across national boundaries (foreign-owned MNC
workers from three different countries are compared in this
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thesis -- Canada, Brazil, and West Germany).

Finally, by

grounding the workers' attitudes within social identity
theory, divergent attitudes between the workers from the
different countries are not only explained, but expected as
well.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that the world is shrinking and
growing at the same time (Schermerhorn, 1978).

Yet are the

forces causing this polarization happening with equal
strength?

The world continues to grow (divide) through

such events as the current conflicts in the republics of
the former Soviet Union -- the most visible (to the Western
World) being the armed conflict in and around Bosnia.
There are other conflicts, such as those in Northern
Ireland and Israel.

Fighting has also erupted in Africa,

though South Africa may be heading for peace.

Cuba

continues to be shut off from the U.S. (and much of the
rest of the world), and the U.S. is forcing trade embargoes
on Haiti and threatening them against Canada, Japan, and
North Korea.
The world is also continuing to shrink as technology
in the communication and transportation fields continues to
grow.

Travel to other countries is becoming cheaper and

quicker, not only for national diplomats, but for the
average citizen as well (though in many countries the price
of long distance travel is still well out of reach for much
of the population).

Transoceanic business meetings are

2

commonplace among large corporations, and faxes and modems
are part of most offices.
The balance between these two forces, though, seems to
be skewed to the former, at least as far as media coverage
is concerned.

National and ethnic conflicts make front

page news, while technological innovations and
transnational transactions are relegated to the back pages.
Can the latter become more powerful than the former, or at
least balanced?

Do people really want to be part of a

global community, or do they they have too much invested in
national pride?

By studying workers within foreign-owned

multinational corporations (MNCs), I will not only try to
make inroads into understanding these questions, but also
look to gain a better understanding of group processes.
For the latter endeavor, I will forsake the mainstream
macro- and microsociological paradigms for a somewhat newer
one:

Social identity.

The use of this theory constitutes

a secondary purpose for this study.
Studying workers' (or any human group's) attitudes is
not an easy task.

Theoretical work in this area is too

aseptic to be used alone, while problems with direct
observation (Hawthorne effect), and interviews and
questionnaires (tendencies to give [perceived] socially
correct answers) make empirical evidence tenuous, and
findings must be used with caution.

In addition, when

studying the effects of specific institutions (in this case
MNCs) on the attitudes of individuals, one should take into
account other institutions that play a part in the observed
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attitudes.

To overcome these shortfalls, I will combine

existing empirical data on workers within foreign-owned
MNCs with media accounts of national affairs and events in
three different countries -- Canada, Brazil, and West
Germany.

This should alleviate some of the parsimony of

studying attitudes and institutions separately, which in
turn should give me a better insight into the formation of
attitudes (loyalties?) of MNC workers when comparing the
different countries.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Many studies concerning groups and group processes
have their roots in the university laboratory.

Many

college students have been assigned to groups through
random selection, given some kind of task, and then had
their response(s) recorded by some social science graduate
student.

These groups then dissipate with (usually) little

or no contact between members after the experiment.

These

studies are then used to explain group processes outside
the university (Paulus and Nagar in Hendrick (ed.), 1987).
In other cases, "real world" small groups and small group
processes are studied, and these findings are used to
explain large group processes

(~

see Bodenhausen,

Gaelick, and Wyer's intriguing explanation of nationalism
based on relationships between heterosexual couples, in
Hendrick, 1987).

Though these studies have been done with

real people, and have been useful to some extent, the study
of groups must be expanded beyond the walls of the
university and small groups. 1 Large group processes (such

1 This is not to say that there are no studies
exclusively concerned with large groups, for there are many
of these. For example, many authors have written about
social movements (~civil rights). Many social
movements, though, when compared to something such as
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as religious affiliation, team fans, nationalism) need to
be studied as phenomena beyond the small group, and
analyzed to further the understanding of how we label
ourselves, and under what circumstances are some group
labels more salient than others.
There are many groups that could be studied, such as
church groups, military groups, social clubs, or athletic
teams. I have decided to study work groups, 2 since work is
so important to a person's self identification (Argyle,
1989).

Another important aspect of a person's self

identification is nationality.

As a matter of fact,

nationalism has been a major cause of war in the past few
centuries (Seabury and Codevilla, 1989).

To study the

salience of cosmopolitan worker vs. nationalistic worker, I
will investigate three multinational corporation (MNC) work
groups:

Ford Canada workers; Brazilian workers in two

u.s.-owned paper/pulp mills operating in Brazil; and, West
German managers employed in MNCs.

Before I begin to

compare and contrast these three groups, a review of three

nationalism are small in scale. Most writers who have
written on the subject of nationalism look only at the
ends, and not the means. In other words, they write on the
relationship between nations and the power this label has
over the people living within the national borders. There
are two things wrong with this. First of all, nations, per
se, do not have relationships -- re~resentatives of the
nations do. Second, how does a national label attract so
many people? I hope to suggest answers to these questions
within the body of the text.
2 r use the term "work groups" to refer not only to
fellow workers, but also other workers employed by the same
company or type of work operating in different countries.
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areas of research is in order.

The areas are group

labeling/social identity theory (with an emphasis on
nationalism as a type of group label), the importance of
work, and the impact of MNCs on home and host countries.
Group Labeling/Social Identity Theory
In-group/out-group distinctions can be found in the
work of many social scientists.

Though this topic began

long before the work of Kant, it is interesting to note
that Kant was one of the first social scientists to present
the idea that humans have a natural tendency (need) to
categorize things (Walsh, 1975).

He did not write about

human groups per se, but his ideas can easily be translated
into the many human group categories that can be found
today

(~

ethnicity, sex, age, religion, nationalism)

which we use to categorize ourselves and others.
Turning to the classical thinkers in sociology, group
differentiation is very salient.

For the early conflict

theorists, such as Marx and Engels, and Weber, the focus
was on group antagonisms (Freeman vs. Slave, Bourgeoisie
vs. Proletariat, political groups or politisher Verband,
and so on); for early functional theorists, such as Comte
and Simmel, the focus was on the needs fulfilled by
different groups (Aron, 1967; Collins, 1986; Hogg and
Abrams, 1988; Marx and Engles, (1848] 1972; Thompson and
Tunstall, 1971).

The idea or notion of different groups

can be found in most sociological work, though it is not
always the focal point.

The works of Goffman, Parsons,
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Homans, Dahrendorf, Mills, Habermas, and many other
sociologists are replete with groups and group affiliation
and differentiation.

Groups are based on family

(~

Simmel, [1922] 1955), the means of production (Marx and
Engles, [1848] 1972), ethnicity
van den Berghe, 1981),
(~Durkheim,

nationality.

sex(~

1971).

(~Rex

and Mason, 1986;

Morris, 1967), religion

Groups are also differentiated by

It is this last categorization that is

examined here.
To some writers, nationalism is not an issue.

For

example, in his typology of groups, Simmel lists (in order
of importance to the individual) family, work, and social
class as the three most important "groups" ([1922] 1955).
From an everyday, inductive standpoint, this type of
reasoning makes sense.

For example, suppose your name is

John Smith, you are an auto mechanic, and consider yourself
to be part of the U.S. working class.

Within national

(U.S.) boundaries, the former two 'labels' (name and work)
would give you an idea of self and where you thought you
stood in U.S. society.

The latter label (U.S. citizen)

would be taken for granted since it would be a common label
for most people with whom you interact on an every day
basis.

Now, let us suppose that you are traveling in a

foreign land and meet another John Smith, who is also an
auto mechanic and considers himself to be part of his
country's working class.

How do you distinguish yourself

from this other John Smith?
i.e. nationality.

Most likely by place of birth,

In other words, nationality can be a
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very salient label under certain circumstances, 3 and may
even become a master label in times of international
conflict.
Unfortunately for Simmel, then, nationalism is a
powerful group marker.

To Weber, " ... nationalism is simply

[political] legitimacy carried to fervid levels" (Collins,
1968, pg. 155); or another definition:
Nationalism ... involves loyalty to a politically
distinct entity, membership in an elaborately
organised and relatively populous social grouping,
adherence to a formalised ideology, and performance or
relatively stereotyped allegiance-expressing behavior
(Meyer, 1985; pg. 8).
In other words, people will fight over national identity
and threats to it.

Fighting does not always have to be

violent, though it often is.

As noted above, Seabury and

Codevilla (1989) point out that "[n]ationalism is the most
widespread excuse for war in our time" (pg. 220).

Pfaff

(1993) calls it "the most powerful political force in the
Twentieth Century" (pg. 13).
Why is nationalism so important to so many people?
Before addressing this question, it is important to look at
some theoretical perspectives that cover group formation
and labeling.

I will examine three such perspectives --

sociobiology, exchange theory, and social identity theory.
In its simplest form, sociobiology explains social
phenomenon through natural selection (Reynolds, Falger and,

3
For example, if you were to meet this same person in
the U.S.
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Vine, 1985).

In human societies, this means that whatever

humans do is based on inclusive fitness for the individual.
In other words, human actions and interactions can be
reduced to what our genes are telling us to do.

Most

sociobiologists would say this is a vulgar simplification
of their theoretical paradigm, and point out that most who
follow this theoretical slant see genetic make-up as only
part of human behavior.

Cultural influences also play a

major role in actions and interactions (Reynolds, et. al.
1985).

This is not the place to open up the debate on

sociobiology, but keep in mind, as van den Berghe pointed
out, " .•. there can be no doubt that biological forces shape
and constrain patterns of human organizations" (Turner,
1991, pg. 167).
Turning to the sociobiological explanation of human
groups,
.•. sociobiologists would emphasize that prior
investments into offspring within a genetic population
will make common defence against non-members very
economical and very likely (Meyer, 1985, pg. 82).
This kind of explanation seems to take as a priori
just the opposite;

non-members would gain by
destroying this population. 4 This interpretation is
~

supported by van der Dennen, who notes that

4 rt is not surprising, given this scenario, that
sociobiology and game theory are very compatible. The idea
of a common defense against what is supposedly a common
aggressor equates to zero-sum games; whatever one group
loses the other one gains (these gains could be absolute or
relative).
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... an individual or a society may be better prepared
to avoid destruction by aliens as a result of a
generalised tendency to distrust, avoid, or reject
foreign-seeming individuals (1985, pg. 8).

Other sociobiologists, such as Melotti (1985) share
this same view point.

Finally, sociobiologists point out

that in-group/out-group distinctions are too universal to
be culturally based, given the variation of cultures around
the world; this tendency must be genetically based
(Reynolds, et. al., 1985).
Homans' exchange theory (as interpreted by Turner,
1991 5 ) refutes such functional interpretations of group
selection.

For Homans, the formation of groups is not

based on genes, but on
the attainment of rewards and avoidance of punishments. Interaction becomes social behavior whereby
the mutual actions of individuals have cost and
reward implications for the parties to the interaction (Turner, 1991., pg. 323).
Also, groups are usually formed around a leader. This
leader has more capital resources 6 which he/she can use to
motivate others (through rewards and/or punishments) to
engage in activities that the leader sees as leading to the
attainment of more capital resources.

The carrying out of

these activities (whether it is conquering a neighboring

5 Turner differentiates between exchange behaviorism
and structural exchange theory. The former is derived from
the work of George c. Homans, while the latter is taken
from Peter M. Blau.
61 capital

resources' does not necessarily mean money.
It could be land, food, weapons, etc .. The important thing
is that one person (or a very small group) has more than
those around him/her (them).
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tribe or starting a business) leads to social organization.
If the group is successful (either by increased rewards or
avoiding punishments) it may become more efficient and

further elaborate its patterns of organization.

An

important element of this theory is that it is grounded in
social structures (networks), and so relations can be
studied outside of bloodlines.
The third perspective is social identity theory.
Social identity theory approaches group formation through
investments in "positively valued distinctiveness from
other groups to provide their members with a positive
social identity" (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. X).

Unlike

sociobiology, where genes are major determinants in human
action and interaction creating a deterministic shading to
the paradigm, social identity sees social categories as
constantly in a state of flux due to economics and history.
This does not mean that people easily redefine group
boundaries.

Since people use group membership as a source

for positive identification (self-esteem), they will not
readily reject current in-groups for possible future outgroups; there is too much at stake.

Not only is positive

self-identification at stake, but so is a person's (or
group's) notion of order:
The theory of social identity rests on an assumption
that categorization is the process by which people
order, and render predictable, information about the
world in which they live. This process of
categorization operates on objects, other people, and
oneself, and consequently people are seen as belonging
to the same or different categories as oneself.
Partly because the categorization involves a
simplification and clarification of perception, and
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partly because there is a motivation to positively
value the self, differentiation between one's own and
other category members is often extreme, and biased in
favour of the ingroup. These factors account for the
existence of social competition and for the rigid and
derogatory stereotypes held of outgroups (Hogg and
Abrams, 1988, pg. 209).
Not only have these authors pointed out the importance of
group membership to the social and psychological order in a
person's life, but also the existence of stereotypes.
The idea of a constant flux in social categories,
though, may provide an important insight into modern
society and multinational corporations.

Transnational

practices of multinational corporations bring about contact
with foreign influences, though contact is not sufficient
to bring about a reduction in intergroup hostilities {Hogg
and Abrams, 1988).

This contact with foreign influences,

though, may have the ability to bring about social change
(Hancock, 1980), and, according to social identity theory,
"social-change beliefs may contribute both to the
maintenance and to the alteration of the status quo ••• "
(Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. 210).

This may seem to be

irrefutable, since a force either changes or does not
change that which it comes up against, but on closer
inspection of this idea one sees that maintenance of the
status quo may actually mean a retrenching of traditional
values; so, in a sense, maintenance of the status quo may
actually be change of some kind.

In other words, if the

superordinate group (the in-group) is confronted by a
subordinate group (the out-group) and it does not accept
the latter, its status quo will not be changed to the
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outside observer, but may have actually become even more
adamant about its own values and beliefs. 7 Also, the
subordinate group can expect resistance if it does not back
away from its confrontation with the superordinate group.
The above summaries do little justice to the breadth
and depth of these three theoretical perspectives and the
literature on group formation as a whole (of which there
are many more theories).
differences and contrasts.
weaknesses.

These three were chosen for their
Each one has its strengths and

Sociobiology addresses the existence of strong

family and clan ties, but theories based on genetic ties
are hard to expand to groups based on nationality (though
their authors try).

Exchange theory (the type discussed

here) is good for small groups with little or no blood
ties, but once again, this theoretical model is stretched
when used to explain the existence of nationalism. 8 Also,

7A group does not have to confront another group to
futher entrench its beliefs and values. Take the example
of the Doomsday cult and its failure to predict the end of
the world. Instead of giving up their beliefs when the end
did not come, they became more unrelenting in their
beliefs, saying their unwavering faith was the reason the
earth had been spared (Lofland, 1977).
8There have been some authors that have used exchange
theory to explain macroprocesses, namely Richard Emerson
(Cook, 1987; Turner, 1991). Unfortunately his work in this
field is concerned mainly with relations between nations,
which sheds little light on the reasons why a large number
of people would choose a nation as part of their identity.
Also, by looking at the relations between nations, I think
that Emerson has taken a macroprocess which involves many
people (or more specifically their representatives) and
turned it into a reified microprocess concerning pieces of
land.
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exchange theorists admit that their theory does not
adequately explain the specific circumstances in which
coalitions form {Gillmore in cook, 1987). It is only social
identity theory that can adequately explain both small
groups (with or without blood ties), as well as large
groups such as those centered around nationality.
Since social identity is the theory of choice for me,
the question as to why nationality is so important to so
many people can now be addressed.

Take an hypothetical

situation, one that is familiar to the reader.

A person is

traveling outside of his/her native country and meets a
stranger from yet another country.

It so happens that they

both speak the same language, do the same kind of work,
share the same ethnic backgrounds, are the same age and
sex, and enjoy the same hobbies.
about these two people?

So what is different

Their nationality.

From a social

identity perspective, this could be enough for them to cast
the other as an out-group member, especially if these
people are in need of some positive self value, or their
respective countries are in some kind of conflict.
not improbable that such meetings could happen. 9

It is

Nationalism of this sort is not confined just to citizens
of the U.S.

Forbes (1985) noted sociological and

psychological studies measuring nationalism could be found

9 For example, citizens from the U.S. and Canada could
meet in a third country (such as Mexico or Germany). It is
also not unlikely that the only difference that these
people would have would be their nationality.
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in articles from South Africa, Australia, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, England, Wales, Sweden,
Lebanon, Tahiti, The cook Islands, Samoa, and Canada.
Exactly how many people are nationalistic is hard to
measure, since nationalism is not only an ambiguous term
(even given the definitions mentioned above), 10 but also
because people tend to vary in the amount of nationalism
they espouse depending on both psychological dispositions
and social situations (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson,
and Sanford, 1950).

still, given the amount of time and

effort spent on the study of nationalism (both directly and
indirectly) it should be clear that it plays a major role
.
in
group f orma t'ion. 11

Recent world events, such as the

fighting in Bosnia and the debate over the North American
Free Trade Act (NAFTA), have also shown the salience (and
importance) of nationality. 12

1 °Forbes notes that nationalism falls somewhere
between patriotism and xenophobia. For the native, this is
the difference between rational and irrational love for
one's country; for the foreigner, both are indications of
an unwillingness to accept new people.
11 According to the Social Science Index, 90 articles
dealing with the subject of nationalism were published in
academic journals between April 1992 and March 1993
(Ehrens, 1993). (A quick review of other works on this
subject includes Barclay, 1972; Benson, 1992; Burg, 1993;
Cornelius, 1993; Deutsch, 1969; Friedman, 1992; Garvey,
1992; Gelb, 1991; Hoagland, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1991; Joffe,
1990; Keatley, 1991; Kedourie, 1961; Kis, 1992; Ladd, 1986;
Leone, 1986; Lewis, 1992; Manning, 1992; Meadwell, 1989;
Pilon, 1992; Schrage, 1992; Shafer, 1955; Walzer, 1993;
Ward, 1966.)
12 some may argue that the fighting in the former
Yugoslavia is not about nationality but about ethnicity,
but I would argue that the groups were fighting for the
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Work
Work has to be done .... It has to be done to
provide food, clothes, shelter, protection from
enemies without and disruptive elements within, care,
protection, and education of children, and all the
elaborate arrangements for entertainment, travel, etc.
to which we have been accustomed (Argyle, 1989).
This passage points to the fact that for basic
survival purposes, most humans have to work.

There are

very few individuals that can escape this reality, to the
point that their basic survival needs are met with no
effort of their own. 13 Work is not only essential to meet
basic survival needs, but may even be necessary for mental
health 14 (Argyle, 1989), as well as for creating new value
in a capitalist society 15 (Wolff, 1984) and a sign from God
for the redemption of the soul (Aron, 1968).

right to have their own state. The NAFTA debates, though
centered around jobs, became a strong anti-Mexico rallying
point for some strong U.S. and Canadian nationalists.
13 The majority of those in this position are severly
handicapped, and it could be argued that basic activities
such as eating and elimination require considerable efforts
on their parts.
14 This idea of the need to work for mental health
reasons may be the motivation for people to continue to
work even when it is not financially necessary. Argyle
(1989) noted that surveys dealing with such issues found
well over 50 percent of the people who took part in the
surveys would continue to work, though some would look for
different employment. (There is a line of argument that
work is loathsome, contradictory to Argyle's stance. This
argument is based on some of Freud's works. See Tausky,
1992).
15 From a Marxist standpoint, this means that not only
is work important to the proletariat (for a number of
reasons, including class consciousness and creativity), but
also to the bourgeoisie, who can only create new value
through surplus labor power.
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The idea that work is important not only to feed and
cloth a person (and possibly his/her family), but also for
mental health reasons makes it a prime candidate for
another category on which to base self-identification as
well as group affiliation.

Marx and Engles thought that

workers in all countries should be part of one group
([1846] 1972), 16 while others saw workers divided among
themselves based on occupational (and industry) status
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Prezeworski and Sprague,
1986). 17
Whether workers see themselves as comprising a
worldwide class, or as smaller occupational groups, there
is sufficient evidence that work (or what one does for a
living) has a strong effect on individual personality and
larger components of society.

For example, Kohn (1990)

stated that "the effect of job conditions on personality
are far from trivial in magnitude .•• " (pg. 40).

According

16 This idea is captured in the famous last line of
Marx and Engles' Communist Manifesto: Workingmen of all
countries, unite! ([1846] 1972, pg. 116). Marx and Engles'
idea of two separate classes in capitalist societies
(bourgeoisie and proletariat) is further emphasized by
other Marxists, such as Disraeli who termed these two
groups as two separate nations (Bottomore in Chambliss,
1973).
17 some industries hold a higher status than others.
For example, to be an engineer in the areospace industry is
likely to carry more status than being an engineer in a
small tool shop, though both may require the same skills.
Also, some companies carry more status than others. In the
Pacific Northwest, the occupational title of Boeing
Engineer will usually carry more status than, say, Red Ball
Engineer.
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to Thompson (1983), "[w]ork has always been necessary to
satisfy the various social needs that exist in human
society" (pg. 38).

Marx and Engles ([1846] 1970) stated

that "[men] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as
soon as they begin to produce their means of
subsistence ... " (pg. 42, emphasis in the original).

Even

in his utopian (communist/socialist) society, Marx pointed
out that labor would be a first need of life (Zdravomyslov,
Rozhin, and Iadov, 1970).

When a GE plant in Ontario, CA.

closed down, a typical response of the displaced workers
was the feeling that one had lost a family member (Haas,
1985).
Sociologists interested in split labor market theory
anchor their theory on the struggles between workers (with
differences between workers usually based on race) which
stem from the workers' fierce loyalties to their work
Bonacich in Pettigrew, 1980).

(~

One of the foremost writers

on humans and their work, the late Everett

c. Hughes,

pointed out that it is not only self-identification that
stems from what one does for a living, but also how others
in society identify individuals:
•.. a man's work is one of the things by which he is
judged, and certainly one of the more significant
things by which he judges himself (pg. 42).
Many people in our society work in named occupations.
The names are a combination of price tag and calling
card (pg. 42) .
... a man's work is one of the more important parts of
his social identity, of his self; indeed, of his fate
in the one life he has to live, for there is something
almost as irrevocable about choice of occupation as
there is about choice of mate (pg. 43).
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•.. the language about work is •.• loaded with value and
prestige judgments ... (pg. 43).
These general statements are backed by a number of
studies done on the unemployed.

Argyle (1989) summarized

some of these studies, and reached the following
conclusions:
General emotional disturbance is lower for those at
work than for all categories of unemployed .... (pg.
291, emphasis in original).
Depression is usually found to be higher among the
unemployed (pg. 292, emphasis in original).
Suicide is more common among the unemployed (pg. 293
emphasis in original).
and
There is no question that the unemployed are in poorer
health than the employed (pg. 293).
All of the above statements make it clear that humans
need to work for self-fulfillment, and that it has a
powerful influence on our lives. 18 This account of the
importance of work could be extended, but little would be
gained from such an extension.

What is important here is

to note that people will not easily quit work, as it meets
the needs not only for basic survival, but also for
positive self values. 19 In other words, when people quit
working (other than through retirement) it is usually due

18 1t is important to note that our non-work lives also
have a powerful influence over our work (Kohn, 1990).
19Argyle points to the fact that even people in low
status occupations will use this occupation to put
themselves above groups such as the unemployed ("At least I
have a job.") (1989).
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to extreme circumstances (Mueller, Wallace, and Price,
1992).
Multinational Corporations CMNCs)
The multinational corporation (MNC) is interesting
sociologically because it is a place where the importance
of nationalism and work are combined.

It is a place where

a researcher can test the power of the group label
"nationalist worker" against the group label "cosmopolitian
worker," and see which, if any, is more salient to nativeborn workers.
There are few, if any, nations that have not been
affected by MNCs, both as home and host nations.

The

actual impact of MNCs on any country is hard to measure.
For example, in 1989 in the U.S., 88,938 foreign-owned
affiliates reported employing a total of 4,734,500 people.
The 1991 20 statistics showed an increase of two percent to
4,809,200 employees working for foreign-owned firms in the
U.S ••

This accounted for 5.2 percent of the U.S. labor

force.

(U.S.-owned MNCs accounted for an even greater
number of employees in the u.s. 21 ) Average wage
compensation for foreign-owned firms operating in the U.S.

20 The 1991 statistics reported were for foreign-owned
nonbank U.S. affiliates.
21 The actual figures for u.s.-owned MNCs are not
known, though it is not hard to come to the conclusion that
these firms employ more U.S. citizens than foreign-owned
firms, based on the number of u.s.-owned MNCs versus
foreign-owned MNCs.
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in 1991 was reported to be $36,200, 26 percent higher than
U.S. firms (Bezirganian, 1993).

The total amount of U.S.

direct investment abroad is estimated at $776.3 billion
(market cost), while the three largest foreign investors in
the U.S. (Japan, 22 the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands)
accounted for $252.7 billion (Scholl, Lowe, and Bargas,
1993).

The U.S. is (at this time) the largest home and

host nation for MNCs, but other nations also have large
investments in MNCs, including Canada and West Germany (two
countries examined in this study).
These statistics, though impressive to those who read
them, do not influence workers as much as popular
literature.

In the U.S. and other nations, headlines, Best

Sellers, and magazine and newspaper articles carry the
stories seen and read by many people.

The stories

concerning MNCs vary from high enthusiasm to dark
pessimism, which means readers may be getting mixed
signals, unless one viewpoint is more prevalent than the
other.

The following is a summary of the typical stories

found in U.S. popular literature.
Arguably, the most salient aspect of MNCs is their
effect on employment (Nicolaides, 1991). 23 In their best
selling book, The New Competitors, Glickman and Woodward
(1989) argued that between 1977 and 1986, u.s.-owned MNCs

22 Nineteen-ninety-two was the first year Japan held
the largest position of foreign investment in the U.S .•
23 This is true for most countries, not just the U.S.
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accounted for a loss of 2.7 million jobs, while foreignowned MNCs resulted in a net loss of 55,863 jobs between
1982 and 1986. 24 The fear of loss of jobs is also the
rallying cry for many opponents of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (McGinn and Moody, 1993; Rothstein,
1991).

Newspapers and magazines with wide readerships such

as The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Post, The
Wall Street Journal, and Fortune, 25 have carried numerous
articles on the detrimental effect on employment of
based MNCs.

u.s.-

At the same time, these same newspapers and

magazines have also run articles stressing the importance
of both foreign-based and U.S.-based MNCs in creating
jobs. 26 These arguments are compounded by a third
viewpoint, in which MNCs have a net effect close to zero

24 This loss, according to Glickman and Woodward, can
be attributed to a number of factors, including downsizing
and the fact that foreign-owned MNCs are many times
vertically integrated in the home country.
25 These newspapers and magazines themselves may not be
read by many working class people, but the stories carried
in these publications are copied in many other local
newspapers around the nation.
26 For example, compare the following headlines: From
The Wall Street Journal -- "New Studies Refute Fears of
Foreign Investment" (October 1, 1991, pg. A22) vs.
"Overseas Calling: American firms send office workers
abroad to use cheaper labor" (August 14, 1991, pg. Al); or
The Oregonian -- "Pickets Protest Foreign Cars" (with an
accompany story regarding the picketers fears of job
exports) (February 11, 1192, pg. 06) vs. "North American
Free Trade Talks: Boon or bane?" (with an accompanying
story of how NAFTA will create numerous jobs in Oregon)
(January 25, 1993, pg. 07).
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(Graham and Krugman, 1991). 27
Another salient issue with MNCs is that of national
security (and the transfer of technology). 28 Should
foreign-based firms be allowed to buy (in this case) U.S.
high-tech companies such as aerospace and weapons
companies?

Again, there is little consensus in the popular

literature.

Ohmae, in his best seller The Borderless World

(1990), promotes the idea that companies (and nations) can
no longer think in terms of national boundaries when
dealing in the global economy.

This viewpoint can be

contrasted with articles carried by The New York Times
(Bradsher, 1993; Zakheim, 1990), Los Angeles Times (1992),
and Time Magazine (Van Voorst, 1992).

These latter

articles are filled with stories of how the U.S. is selling

27 Graham and Krugman base their findings on the
macroeconomics of employment determined by supply, not
demand. In their own words:
Suppose, for example, that a wave of FDI
[foreign direct investment] into the United States
turned out to have a substantial immediate
positive effect on demand for US workers. The
normal response of the Federal Reserve would be to
tighten monetary policy to avoid accelerating
inflation, so that any job gains resulting from
the investment would be off set by job losses
elsewhere. Conversely, a wave of investment that
had a negative impact of the demand for labor
would be met by looser monetary policy and thus be
offset by job gains elsewhere (pg. 61).
This kind of argument can be also be applied to outgoing
FDI.
28 once again, this concern is not relegated to just
the U.S.
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off its ability to defend itself; that it will soon be an
easy target for attack.
The ability of MNCs to evade taxes also receives
plenty of attention in popular books, newspapers, and
magazines.

Glickman and Woodward point out that many

foreign-owned firms know that states will bid for them, and
one of the bargaining chips is that of tax breaks (1989).
Articles in the leading national newspapers and magazines
have also touched on the evasive powers of both foreignbased and U.S.-based MNCs when it comes to paying taxes
(Gleckman, 1990; Heins, 1986; Hilzenrath, 1993; Martz,
1991; Mcintyre, 1989; Moskowitz, 1991).
These are not the only issues raised by the popular
literature in regard to MNCs. 29 The overall power of MNCs
is frequently cited (Brannigan, 1990; Grieder, 1992; Piel,
1992).

The recent sale of the Seattle Mariners to Japanese

investors (Ninetendo) caused a stir in professional
baseball. MNCs vs. anti-trust laws are also part of the
literature, as are social policies (should MNCs be
concerned with host countries' problems?).

Each of these

issues has both its opponents and proponents.

This makes

it extremely difficult to say where most readers would
stand on these issues (and the issue of MNCs in general)

29 A popular fictional book and movie that was released
at the time of this study was Michael Crichton's Rising Sun
(the book was published in 1992). The statement that
"business is war" sums up the Crighton's depiction of
Japanese businessmen, evoking images of Pearl Harbor and
World war II.
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without some kind of survey.

Fortunately there have been

some surveys on this matter.
One was done in 1988 by Smick-Medley and associates
and the results were reported in the 1988 May/June issue of
The International Economy (U.S. attitudes toward foreign
investment, 1988).
.,.

Respondents to this survey were

categorized into two groups -- Masses and Elites.

Elites

consisted of people such as Congressmen, mayors, and
corporate leaders, and Masses are all those who are not
part of at least one of the above categories, in other
words, ordinary "working class" people.

Approximately 100

Elites and 900 members of the working class took part in
this survey.

Both the questions and results of the survey

are shown in TABLE I.
TABLE I
U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1) 3 0
Foreign Investors:
Can cause a financial crisis
by withdrawing their money
from U.S. banks

Yes

Masses (%)
No
DK

Yes

Elites (%)
No
DK

80

15

5

55

42

2

Might pull their money out
at any time

77

19

3

39

61

0

Have more influence in
our national government

75

21

4

55

41

3

Cause Americans to have
less control over our
economy

74

22

3

39

58

3

30 source for TABLES I and II, U.S. attitudes toward
foreign investment, 1988. DK = Don't know.
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TABLE I
U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1)
(continued)
Yes

Masses (%)
No
DK

Yes

Elites (%)
No
DK

If Foreigners Owned Your Bank:
Would you get higher rates
on your account?

17

61

22

4

80

15

Would it affect your ability
to get a loan?

23

61

16

4

82

14

Would it jeopardize the safety
of your savings account?
41

45

14

3

90

7

What to Do About Foreign Investment:
Prohibit any further
investment

40

54

6

1

99

0

Register foreign investors

89

8

3

48

45

8

Limit foreign investment in
the U.S.

78

18

4

13

86

1

Encourage joint ventures

69

25

6

70

25

6

Give tax breaks to foreign
investors

21

75

4

52

40

8

These survey results show that there is no one set of ideas
about MNCs in the U.S., and that there is a large
differential between Elites and Masses. 31 This is further
supported by the last question asked in the survey, which
can be found in TABLE II (page 27).
As can be seen, the numbers show the disparity between
the Masses and the Elites.

Marx would probably have found

31 And, of course, there is no 'pure' consensus within
these groups.
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TABLE II
U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2)
If foreigners bought the firm
you work for. would you:
Resign
Organize resistance
Write to Congress
Support Legislation
Support foreigners
Do nothing

Masses(%)

Elites(%)

6

0

25

9

26
4

0
1

16
7

37
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these findings unsurprising. 33
The second survey was a New York Times/CBS News Poll,
which appeared in The New York Times on July 10, 1990
(Oreskes, 1990).
Medley survey:

It differed in two ways from the SmickRespondents were not categorized in any

way, and questions were asked only about Japan's investment
in the U.S.

One thousand-eighty-four people were asked to

respond to a series of statements, two of which are shown
below (TABLE III, page 28), accompanied with the percentage
of the people who answered "yes" to the statements.
People who took part in this survey said that they were
beginning to fear Japanese economic might more so than

32 The total percentages of both groups do not equal
100 percent, but 84 percent for the Masses and 72 percent
for the Elites. It can only be assumed that the numbers
were copied wrong, or a category was left out of the final
report (such as a "Don't Know" category).
33 These findings are not universally accepted.
Partner (1992) says that the fear of foreigners
(specifically the fear of Japanese) goes beyond "the man on
the street." One of the phobias he discusses is Japanese
neo-colonialism that seems to affect people in both
categories.
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TABLE III
U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAPANESE
Statement

% of "yes" answers

Japanese compete unfairly in business

38

Most Americans look down on Japanese

4734

Soviet military power.
These surveys, though, leave many stories untold.

How

do the people who are directly affected (i.e., the workers
within the MNCs) feel about the role of MNCs?

It may be

that a large percentage of U.S. citizens are fearful of
foreign investors (and of foreigners taking jobs away from
U.S. workers), but, if this is true, does it hold for U.S.
workers employed within these entities?

What about other

countries? For example, the three countries that will be
examined in this study have all been home and host
countries to MNCs.

Will their workers embrace or eschew

foreign direct investment?

In the following chapter

(Chapter Three) I will discuss this problem in more detail,
as well as formulate my main hypothesis.

Chapter Four will

deal with methods of data retrieval.

34 when the pollsters posed this same statement to
Japanese about their attitudes towards Americans, 48
percent answered "yes."

CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
The preceding chapter made it clear that the worker
within the multinational corporation is worthy of study.
MNCs are one of the few social institutions that cross
national boundaries.

The other two types of social

institutions that typically crossover international borders
are national governments and voluntary organizations. 1 The
former, though not necessarily violent, usually brings with
it strong feelings of nationalism on the parts of both the
host and home countries involved. This may be obvious in
the case of an invading army, 2 but this is also generally
true of embassies and visiting governmental dignitaries.
Since nationalism is a strong motivational device for
labeling in- and out-group members, this makes any kind of
national governmental body an unlikely harbinger of
welcomed social change. 3 The latter, voluntary

1This leaves out individuals and small groups such as
tourists. such individuals and small groups are not
considered social institutions. I also leave out the
United Nations, since it is still trying to adapt to its
transnational role.
2This has also been the case with most United Nation
peacekeeping operations.
3This is clearly visible in third party "Peace Talks."
Even a neutral nation can be seen as taking sides with one
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organizations, are too varied in nature to generalize from
one kind to another

(~

Peace Corps vs. The Jesuits;

these two groups are both voluntary groups with
international linkages, but their goals are not the same).
MNCs, on the other hand, do have two things in common -the search for profits, and they employ foreign workers at
some point in their operations.

This makes it possible to

compare across companies from different countries,
operating in different countries, and engaged in many
different areas of production.
The fact that MNCs employ foreign workers does not
mean that all individual workers are the same, even if all
worked for MNCs.

Kohn (1991} points out 14 different

aspects of work that can affect workers' attitudes toward
their jobs. 4 Aspects of work such as average number of
hours worked per week and dirtiness of the job are not the
same in all MNCs.

Someone working for an international

bank is probably not going to have the same feelings toward
work as someone who works for an international ditch
digging company.

Work conditions and individual workers'

perspectives of work conditions are not going to be

party or the other, and this can even be a criticism from
both sides!
4These fourteen aspects are ownership,
bureaucratization, hierarchial position, substantive
complexity of work, closeness of supervision, degree of
routinization, time pressure, heaviness, dirtiness, the
number of hours worked in the average week, being held
responsible for things outside one's control, risk of
losing one's job, job protections, and job income.
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comparable across MNCs, but what about the overall
attitudes of workers toward MNCs?

Is it true, as Maxcy

(1981) put it, that economic man (hereafter referred to as
Can MNC workers
"economic person") has no nationality? 5
be considered as economic persons, or only the capitalists
who are the driving force behind MNCs? 6
The idea that workers may not be classified as
"economic persons" forms the basis for my main hypothesis.
True economic persons would be indifferent to the national
currency of profits or paychecks.

If workers are true

economic persons, their only concern would be that they
receive fair pay (or some other kind of compensation) for
fair work.

Since many foreign-owned MNCs pay higher wages

than both indigenous MNCs and domestic businesses, this
would seem to be even more of an incentive for workers to
welcome these companies.

Therefore, my main hypothesis is

as follows:
• If a person is employed within a foreign-owned MNC,
then he/she will have a positive attitude towards
foreign-owned MNCs (or at least a more positive

5This idea is supported by Frank (1980). The CEOs in
his study were very adamant about the home country
government staying out of their business dealings in host
countries. See also Chapter Five in Maxcy's book on the
automobile MNCs' interests during World War Two.
6The 'driving force' mentioned here is not to be
confused with the labor power that generates the products
and/or services provided by the MNCs -- that comes from the
workers. The 'driving force' generated by the capitalists
is the search for profits that transends national
boundaries.
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attitude when compared to those not employed by
foreign-owned MNCs).
But, as seen in the last chapter, nationalism is a
strong group label.
paying work?

Is it strong enough to override well

By hypothesizing that the workers' way of

life will be satisfied by the foreign-owned MNC, a null
hypothesis would point out that either foreign-owned MNCs
do not satisfy workers' expectations for adequate wages
(and other work variables such as safety and benefits) or
that workers are not economic persons, and that
nationalistic pride has given them reason to find fault
with foreign-owned MNCs (and possibly home-based MNCs as
well).

If the former is true, then possibly the MNCs could

gain worker loyalty through higher wages (and/or added
benefits).

If the latter is true, there is little foreign-

owned MNCs can do to convince native workers to welcome
them, and they will have to continually fight to win the
loyalties of these workers (possibly by trying to win the
favor of national leaders).

If the hypothesis turns out to

be supported in each case under study, then it is quite
possible that MNC workers are truly economic persons.
Either way, the study of large group label formation, as
well as social identity theory, will have been taken a
small step forward.
To test the above hypothesis, it will be necessary to
construct a nationalistic structure of each country being
studied.

Measuring the workers' attitudes with only

quantitative scales paints only half of a picture.

What is
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still needed is a national context in which to place such
findings.

This is the only way to present a solid (though

still incomplete) 7 foundation of the workers' life
experiences in regard to foreign direct investment at the
time of the studies.

In the next chapter, I will discuss

those aspects that will be included in this study, the
logic behind my choices, and the data which will be used.

7This incompleteness comes from not knowing the
individuals' total life experiences. Age, education,
family views, and so forth would play some part in a
person's attitudes in most, if not all, areas. All I can
hope to do is understand those aspects that are readily
available to the outside observer.

CHAPTER IV
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
Quantitative data have already been collected and
analyzed for MNC workers' attitudes (the dependent variable
in this study) in the three countries that I will be
studying -- Canada, Brazil, and West Germany.

Marton

questioned Canadian workers employed by Ford Canada in
1971; Blake and Driscoll reported survey results from
Brazilian workers employed by two u.s.-owned paper/pulp
mills in 1974, 1 and Sauvant and Mennis studied German
workers within West German MNCs in 1976 (both foreign- and
domestic-owned). 2 What is missing is a larger (national)
context in which these studies can be set and examined more
closely.
Through available materials (such as the New York
Times Index, government documents, books, and periodicals),
a nationalistic structure (context) will be constructed for
each country.

There could be many variables within a

national context that could affect workers' attitudes

1 A Brazilian research firm -- Demanda Instituto de
Pesquisas e Estudos de Mercado Ltda. -- administered the
actual questionnaires.
2All of the above studies can be found in Fayerweather
{1982).
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toward MNCs. 3

I will confine my study to six that

generally get media coverage (or influence it), and,
therefore, would be easily accessible to the work force of
a country. 4 The six independent variables will include:
(1) national political leaders' attitudes toward foreign
investment and aid (both inward and outward), (2) military
activities involving each country (once again, both inward
and outward), (3) strikes and/or worker unrest within the
countries, (4) Gross National Product (GNP), (5) GNP per
capita, and (6) unemployment statistics. 5
These variables may not be the most important ones for
a business person to examine when deciding whether or not
to undertake foreign investment, but I see them as possibly
the most salient in the media, and, therefore, to the
average worker.

First of all, most media organizations

assign one (or more) of their best reporters to cover
political leaders (e.g. presidents, foreign ministers,
cabinet members), which means that their statements and

3There could also be many individual variables as
well, such as military service, family background,
education, and so forth, but these do not explain
widespread tendencies.
4This is not to say that an authoritarian government
would allow coverage of an embarassing worker uprising, but
given enough media coverage elsewhere (and foreign media
coverage was widespread by the 1970s), there is a great
likelihood that other workers within that country would
find out about the uprising.
5wage rates may be another important factor, but
unless workers are aware that they make more or less than
others in comparable situations this kind of information
would be of little help.
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actions are news.

When such leaders speak on the subject

of foreign aid and/or investment, not only does the
coverage become more widespread, but so does the analyses
of such news.

This is due to the fact that national

leaders are usually seen by a majority of the citizens as
embodying all that the nation stands for, so their dealings
with other nations are closely watched to make sure they
fit in with the citizens' ideas of what they should be
doing.

In other words, if a majority of a nation's

citizens feel that another nation should be dealt with
harshly, but their national leader(s) treats this nation
with compassion, this leader will probably be seen as weak
or selling out his/her homeland.

If this leader continues

to treat the other nation with compassion and can convince
his/her constituency that there are good reasons for such
treatment, it may be that the citizens will change their
point of view.

If not, this leader may find him-/herself

without a constituency.

Because of the gravity of the

situation in national relations, and the amount of media
coverage such stories receive, I think that by studying the
national leaders' attitudes toward foreign aid and/or
investment I can ascertain the general feeling on this
subject within a nation.

My first supporting hypothesis,

then, is:
• If national leaders voice positive views towards
foreign investment and/or intervention, then foreignowned MNC workers will have positive attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs.
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As with national leaders, military activities are
heavily covered by the media and reflect national attitudes
(though not necessarily universal, a majority of a nation's
citizenry will usually back their military).

For example,

in the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War, the outpouring of
support for then President George Bush's actions against
Iraq could be seen in the popularity polls that gave Bush
his highest rating during his Presidential term.

Though

pacifists have been opposed to every major war in the
Twentieth Century, including the Persian Gulf War, they are
usually a small minority once military action has been
taken.

For this reason, if military action is taking place

(or has recently) within the nations under study I can
expect strong feelings of nationalism, and a negative view
towards foreign aid and investment (both incoming and
outgoing).

This strong nationalism could possibly be

neutralized by national leaders saying that the military
activity is a necessary gesture of some kind

(~

the

restoration of democracy) and should not be seen as a
'national' statement.

In such a case, citizens may view

the majority of citizens of the other nation as unfortunate
recipients of bad luck (or bad leaders) and should not be
seen as enemies per se.

Inward military activity would, in

almost every case, generate extreme nationalistic
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attitudes. 6

In relation to my main hypothesis, my second

supporting hypothesis is:
If a nation is experiencing military intervention
of some kind (inward or outward), then foreign-owned
MNC workers will show negative attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs. 7
Strikes and worker unrest do not usually receive the
type and amount of coverage given to national leaders and
military operations, but the word "strike" (when used in
conjunction with work and workers) carries a highly
emotional charge.

Strikes, no matter what the issue or

players involved, are often thought of as pitting exploited
workers against exploiting owner(s).

It can be expected

that if a high number of strikes take place within the
countries (and especially in foreign-owned MNCs) that the
MNC workers' attitudes would be anti-MNC (for that matter,
anti-business), even if they are not involved within a
strike.

An interesting aspect of strikes within MNC work

forces is whether workers employed by the same company (or

6The bombing of London and Germany during WWII are
prime examples of such military tactics that brought about
extreme nationalistic views among the victims of the
attacks (Seabury and Codevilla, 1989). Abbott (1988) notes
that the same thing happened in Haiti during the U.S.
occupation (1915-1933).
7This second supplemental hypothesis cannot be worded
in the affirmative since an absence of military
intervention would not necessarily bring about positive
attitudes towards MNCs. The nationality of the other
country would matter very little in this situation, as
relations with this other country are based mainly on
hostilities.
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same industry) in different countries would be likely to
sympathize with each other during strikes.

This was not

the case in Dutch-based industries operating in India
(Banaji and Hensman, 1990), or in the 1994 longshoremen
strike in Canada.

In the former, the workers in the

different countries did not communicate during times of
strikes (though the authors felt this would have improved
the working environment for both parties), and in the
latter, goods being shipped to Canadian ports were diverted
to U.S. ports and shipped to Canada on overland routes.

If

this is the general tendency in such cases, it points out
that workers are not seeing themselves on an international
scale. 8 This leads me to my third supporting hypothesis:
• If there is a small number 9 of strikes within a
nation, then foreign-owned MNC workers will have
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
The causal relationship stated in this hypothesis
could run in either direction -- positive attitudes could
lead to fewer strikes.

Though this may be true, I think

that if an industry or country is plagued by strikes, even

8 It is interesting to note that MNC owners (or CEOs,
or whoever is in charge) frequently transfer work to other
operations in other countries during strikes (Kujawa,
1979). Whether or not this practice is the cause for the
workers' willingness to do the work of other striking
workers is worth investigating.
9An actual number is hard to pinpoint, and so the
ambiguous term 'small number'. Though this could be just
about any number, I will consider a nation to have
experienced a small number of strikes if less than 200 were
reported within a year.

40

if foreign-owned MNCs are not directly involved, all
workers could be anxious.

This anxiety could be

exacerbated within the foreign-owned MNC by knowing that
labor negotiations are (possibly) carried out in another
country.
Gross National Product {GNP) is not something that
workers constantly see or hear within the media, but,
because it is a leading economic indicator used by national
leaders to gauge the economic strength of a country, it is
mentioned often or used as a basis for a speech and/or
political campaign.

For this reason, I will make this part

of my national equation.

My fourth supporting hypothesis

is as follows:
• If GNP is rising, then foreign-owned MNC workers
will show positive attitudes toward foreign-owned
MNCs.
I separated GNP and GNP per capita because while GNP
may be increasing arithmetically, the population of a
nation may be increasing geometrically, and, therefore, the
GNP per capita would be shrinking. 10 If this is true, or
for some other reason GNP per capita is falling or rising
slower than GNP, then foreign-owned MNC workers will
espouse negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.

To

rephrase this as my fifth supporting hypothesis:

10 In the data analysis and testing of hypotheses, GNP
and GNP per capita may be treated jointly, though they will
have different values.
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If GNP per capita is rising at least as fast as
GNP, then foreign-owned MNCS workers will have
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
Employment is one of the major concerns when talking
about MNCs (Nicolaides, 1991), and therefore would gain
much media exposure. 11 Though the effect of MNCs on
employment is still hotly contested (as shown in Chapter II
above), it would seem that if a nation's unemployment rate
were high, any firm (including MNCs) offering jobs would be
considered to be doing a good service for the country and
its workers.

My sixth supporting hypothesis is stated as

follows:
If unemployment within a nation is high, 12 foreignowned MNC workers would have positive attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs. 13
Each of the above independent variables will be
considered sufficient to cause positive or negative

11 unemployment rates or trends do not have to involve
MNCs to get media coverage. As with GNP, unemployment
rates are used as a major economic indicator (at all levels
of an economy). This tends to exacerbate employment
effects of MNCs.
12 once again, what is considered high unmemployment?
I will choose six percent, since this is the high end of
what economists within the U.S. say is the average rate of
unemployment. Though I am not studying the U.S., I am
using U.S. concepts when reporting unemployment rates.
13 As with the second hypothesis, low unemployment does
not necessarily mean negative attitudes. If a country is
experiencing low unemployment, then more weight should be
given to another variable.
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attitudes separately, 14 but not necessary.

Unfortunately,

it is not easy to treat each one separately, as they are
interwoven (see Figure 1, though even this is misleading).
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Figure 1. Model of hypothesized interactions of
independent variables on dependent variable.
Elections can be won or lost over employment issues, which
in turn may be tied to military activities and/or GNP
figures.

High unemployment may cause those still working

to strike for guaranteed employment rights.

I will present

each independent variable separately when possible, but the

14 Except the absense of military action, which is
hypothesized to have no effect on the workers.
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nature of these variables does not always give me that
opportunity. This should not be regarded as negatively
affecting the study, as separating interdependent variables
may have the affect of emphasizing or de-emphasizing them
by taking them out of context, which would render them
ineffective (atomistic fallacy), though the supporting
hypotheses will be presented both separately and in
combination.
Finally, a time frame must be set.

Attitudes do not

form in a vacuum -- historical events play a part, nor are
they static -- the social identity paradigm allows for
shifts in attitudes.

For this reason, I will not trace the

leaders, military activities, or strike histories of each
nation back to the nations' inceptions.

Each of these will

be traced back two years before each study and the year in
which the study took place, while GNP, GNP per capita, and
unemployment rates will be traced back four years plus the
year of the study.

Though attitudes are formed over a

lifetime, these time frames allow for some lag time impacts
on attitudes -- an important feature in social identity
theory, as well as immediacy effects.

I turn now to the

actual data analysis and testing of the supporting
hypotheses.

CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES
I will try to reconstruct each nation separately by
first looking at the independent variables that are treated
in a qualitative manner.

Because I think it is important

to closely examine each country, some of the narrative may
seem redundant.

Hopefully this will not be the case

throughout, but it is imperative that the reader be fully
aware of cultural, political, and societal events that were
taking place during the times when the questionnaires were
administered.

Events that may now seem trivial may have

had major impacts on the respondents.

When the independent

variables are treated in a quantitative manner (such as GNP
figures), I will present them separately (after the former)
in tabular form. 1 This will be followed by how my
supporting hypotheses would predict the workers' attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs, the results of the studies
involving the MNC workers, and whether my supporting
hypotheses predicted the actual outcomes.

1All the information given for each country has been
taken from The New York Times Index, unless otherwise
specified.
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Also, though I have chosen to study the two years
prior to and the year the questionnaires were administered
for each country (three years total), 2 it is imperative
that I spend a short amount of time on some general history
of each country that may have played a part in the workers'
attitudes.

Any sociological study, longitudinal or

otherwise, is lacking due to historical shortfalls -- this
one included.

The brief general histories are presented

here to try to alleviate some of this deficiency.
CANADA
General History
Foreign direct investment to Canada (especially from
the U.S.) has been strong since the mid 1800s.

Serving a

small market in a large geographical area did not suit
Canada's late starting industrial firms, though U.S.
factories had by this time achieved economies of scale that
made it possible for them to service Canadian markets.

In

1872, the Canadian government helped this process with
passage of the Patent Act, which made companies who
received patents in Canada use that patent within two years
after issue. Since U.S. companies were so far ahead of
Canadian firms in research and development, they took
advantage of this new law.

This continued well into the

Twentieth Century -- Canadians received only five percent

2A total of five years for GNP, GNP per capita, and
unemployment rates.
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of patents issued between 1968 and 1969, while the U.S.
received sixty-seven percent and other countries twentyeight percent (Niosi, 1985).
Another act passed by the Canadian government that
encouraged foreign direct investment was the Tariff Act of
1879.

The resulting tariff measures forced many U.S.

companies to bypass the tariffs by setting up MNCs.

This

was to shift later, but the immediate result was the
overwhelming presence of foreign firms (mainly U.S.) in
many sectors of the Canadian economy {Niosi, 1985). 3
In 1965, the U.S. and Canada signed a trade agreement
covering automotive manufacturing concerns in both
countries. 4 The Canadian automotive industry had been
inefficient after World War II, and looked to its southern
neighbor to strengthen this sector.

The U.S. had become

the number one car manufacturer in the world after WWII,
and its invitation into Canada was met with open arms by
many Canadians.

Between the signing of the agreement in

1965 and 1973, Canada's automotive production increased
tremendously.

This increase was accompanied by sizable

increases in employment within the sector.

Canadian

autoworkers gained wage parity with U.S. autoworkers during
this time as well.

These two factors (production and

3Foreign capital investments in Canada for 1969-1971,
the period under study, was as follows (millions U.S.$):
1969 -- 41,602; 1970 -- 44,037; and, 1971 -- 46,250.
4Ford Canada, which employed the workers questioned,
was established in 1904 (Maxcy, 1981).
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employment increases) gave most Canadians reason to feel
comfortable with the agreement, but there were those that
felt the U.S. had overstepped its boundaries and even more
workers could be employed if Canadians were doing the
hiring.

Plus, governmental inducements and incentives for

U.S. companies caused small schisms to appear between the
signatories of the agreement (Maxcy, 1980).

Since the

workers questioned were employed by Ford Canada, these
matters may have influenced perceptions of their employer.
Politics
Much resentment towards the U.S. (and U.S.
investments) could be found in Canada between 1969 and
1971, though this animosity was not aimed at all foreign
countries.

Early in 1969, Minister Edgar J. Benson said

that domestic fears of Canadian economic subordination to
the U.S. may have some basis, and Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau backed this with the notion that some sectors
needed to be protected from foreign investments and started
talks on a ban on foreign ownership.

This came on the

heels of a small economic boom in the Western Provinces
that was spurred by Japanese investments.

Some feared

these investments, but Trudeau said such (Japanese)
investments were inevitable.

This apparent contradiction

points out that Trudeau and his government may not have
been so worried about foreign investment as long as it did
not come from the U.S.
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After Canadian officials made it clear that they
believed Canada had better long-run economic potential than
the U.S., the Canadian Cabinet approved a bill in 1969 that
would create the Canada Development Corporation.

Though

this organization was to oversee all foreign investments,
it was clear that it was specifically directed towards U.S.
investments.

Since much of U.S. investments could be found

in existing firms, Canadians were fearful of U.S. investors
continuing this pattern and taking over what would, in all
regards, be turnkey operations for U.S. firms.

This would

mean less capital going to sectors such as construction.
The Canada Development Corporation was meant to mobilize
Canadian funds to stave off such ventures.

Some even felt

it should be used to cleanse the country of all U.S.
investments.

Though the Corporation would not materialize

until 1971, a high level effort was begun to minimize U.S.
investments.
Minimizing U.S. investments in Canada was not easy.
Shortly after the bill was passed to establish the Canada
Development Corporation, Trudeau was again facing public
pressure to immediately halt continued U.S. investments.
Some even called for nationalizing some sectors, though
this was quickly turned down by the government.

Not only

did Trudeau and his government have to appease the public,
but he was also getting bad news from the academic world.
One study showed that Canadians had not thought deeply
about U.S. economic control through u.s.-owned
subsidiaries.

Now Canadians were being told that effects
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of U.S. economic domination could possibly be worse than
they had feared.
Whether to divert internal concerns over U.S. economic
control, or possibly as a statement to the U.S. and
concerned Canadian citizens that he, Trudeau, was in charge
of Canada, he made it publicly known that talks were to
begin with Communist China.

The U.S. voiced its concern

over this decision, resulting in a Washington

o.c. visit by

Trudeau to discuss Canadian and U.S. policies with
President Richard Nixon.

After the meeting, Trudeau

announced that Canada would continue to have friendly ties
with the U.S., but that Canada must pursue independent
policies from that of its southern neighbor.

Talks with

China were immanent.
Trudeau's critics called the U.S. visit inconclusive,
but shortly thereafter Trudeau began talks with Peking,
saying Canada was moving away from being a U.S.- and
European-oriented nation.

Benson reiterated this sentiment

by saying that Canada was not a political satellite of any
other country, and need not worry about the U.S.'s dislike
of talks with Peking.

Trudeau not only felt that Peking

was important to Canada's future, but that Asia in general,
as well as Latin America, were important.

Trudeau pointed

to the growing amount of trade between Canada and Japan as
an example of other countries' importance.
Unfortunately for Canada, beginning diplomatic talks
with Peking meant the possiblity of severing existing ties
with Taiwan (Nationalist China).

This is what happened, at
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least for a short time.

Taiwan was not ready to trade with

a country that seemed so intent on pursuing friendly ties
with its nemesis and quickly severed ties with Canada.
This meant that not all of Asia was ready to negotiate with
Canada (or at least not all at the same time).

Still,

Canada continued talks with Peking throughout 1969, though
little progress was made.
Not only did Canada begin diplomatic ties with Peking
in 1969, it also openly courted the

u.s.s.R.

Soviet

Foreign Minister Gromyko toured Ottawa, much to the
displeasure of U.S. officials.

Again, observers felt this

was aimed at distancing Canadian foreign relations policies
from those of the U.S.

Whether or not this was the goal of

Trudeau's administration, it was obvious that the U.S. was
not welcomed with open arms.

This could be seen in the

opposition mounted against Phillip Morris' offer to buy
fifty percent of Canadian Breweries Ltd. common stock.
deal was defeated.

The

Canadian officials were even quick to

point out that they were increasing their foreign aid to
poor countries while the U.S. lowered its foreign aid,
though the U.S. was still higher in absolute figures.
Canada's anti-u.s. measures (in the economic realm)
continued in 1970.

After U.S. officials noted that the

U.S. and Canada needed to become a trading bloc (without
jeopardizing Canada's sovereignty), and that MNCs were the
best way to turn Canada's natural resources into capital,
Canada officials refused to allow a U.S. company to buy
controlling interest in Canada's largest uranium mine.
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This move was seen as an intensification of economic
nationalism on the part of Trudeau.

Shortly after this,

the U.S. once again sent Canadians (officials and citizens
alike) scrambling when the Commerce Department forecast a
massive rise in U.S. investments going north -- close to
$2.7 billion.
The economic nationalist's increasing cries for
government intervention on behalf of a separate Canadian
economy -- two-thirds of manufacturing and mining
industries in Canada were foreign owned in 1970 with the
U.S. owning well over half of the latter and almost as much
of the former -- seemed to be getting through to Canadian
officials.

Minister John James Greene said that the U.S.

must prepare for a Canada that would have stringent control
over all foreign investments, no matter what the industry.
Some Canadians began to be worried about domestic security
firms and felt that foreign companies had no right to
ownership of these firms.

A proposed sale of Ryerson

Press, Canada's oldest publishing house, to U.S.-owned
McGraw Hill was adamantly opposed and eventually fell
through.

When a cry went out that U.S. interests were

buying up recreational lands, economic nationalists were
quick to play up the concern.

Pravada, U.S.S.R.'s official

government newpaper, added fuel to the economic
nationalists' fires by reporting anxiety within the
u.s.s.R. over U.S. business ties in Canada.
Government-level talks between Canada and the U.S.
oscillated precipitously.

In the midst of cries for
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economic nationalism and measures to curb U.S. investment,
Canadian officials seemed torn between wanting less U.S.
capital and needing more to keep the Canadian economy
growing.

Though many new policies were seen as restricting

new U.S. investments, a government report on future foreign
policy noted that the U.S. would remain Canada's closest
friend and ally (this latter word may be key to why the
report was written in such a way).

The report, though,

said the two countries must be distinct, and that ties with
Europe, Asia, and Latin America must be nurtured.
Canadians also showed dissatisfaction with President Nixon
when he did not mention Canada in his State of the World
Message, and were less than pleased with a visit from the
U.S. Under Secretary.

In Toronto, a firebomb was thrown

through the U.S. consulate's window as some Canadians acted
out their displeasure over U.S. presence.

Still the two

nations did come together to start a joint venture to curb
drunk driving,

although this may seem insignificant in

light of the turbulence in economic matters.
Canada's other foreign policy decisions were aimed at
continuing the increase of foreign aid and continuing to
nurture ties with Communist China.

After twenty months of

diplomatic talks, Canada did recognize Peking.

Many

Canadians, both in Trudeau's and the opposition's party,
saw this as a sign of gaining independence from the U.S.
Shortly afterwards, Canada sent an envoy to China, though
the move was not reciprocated.

Canada's ties with Taiwan

took a complete turn during these relations.

First, Taiwan
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reversed its decision to severe economic ties with Canada,
saying the talks with Peking had no impact on their
relations.

But then, immediately after Peking was

recognized, Taiwan did severe ties.

Also, though Nixon was

to travel to Peking shortly after Canada recognized Peking,
the U.S. made it known that this new diplomatic
relationship would not affect U.S. policies toward
Communist China or Canada.

Canada was actively seeking

opportunities for overseas investments as well.

The

Canadian International Development Agency, which granted
moneys for exploratory and feasibility studies for Canadian
firms looking to invest overseas, was established in 1970
(Niosi, 1985).

The Development Corporation followed in

1971.
After 1971, the Development Corporation became a
permanent part of the Canadian landscape. 5 Its development
was slow, however, because some Canadian businessmen saw
anti-u.s. economic policies as hurting Canada's economy,
especially after the OECD stated that Canada would continue
to be a hotbed for U.S. investments.

This debate seemed to

cloud the picture of economic independence.

Trudeau's

administration felt the need for U.S. investments to create
new jobs -- unemployment was over six percent --, but knew
there was widespread public support for Canadian

5The Development Corporation helped Canadian-based
MNCs and other foreign direct investments by offering such
services as foreign investment insurance (Niosi, 1985).
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independence that was supposedly imperiled by U.S.
investments.

It seemed like the latter had more weight.

When a U.S. company sought to begin a paper/pulp mill in
Northwest Saskatchewan (a region with high unemployment) it
was seen as a setback for Canadian economic independence. A
Premier election in that Province was won by the candidate
that was most opposed to U.S. investment.

Other government

shakeups were the result of a perceived need to curb
foreign (U.S.) investments.

Also, Canadians found little

comfort in Nixon's reassurances that the U.S. had no
intentions of making Canada a U.S. colony -- they felt
threatened whenever the U.S. mentioned some kind of
economic bloc pact.

When U.S. companies tried to freeze

wages in Canadian subsidiaries, angry Canadian officials
said U.S. companies had no right to force policies on its
subsidiaries.

In Ottawa, a move was made to nationalize

all resource industries (though the government did reject
the proposals).

In Ontario, Premier William G. Davis'

government was said to be nationalistic and, indeed, did
begin giving tax breaks to Canadian firms.

These fears

soon spread to concerns over U.S. dominance in Canadian
education and communications. 6 To a certain extent, even
Canadians working in the U.S. were viewed by their fellow
citizens as turncoats.

A surcharge on Canadian firms'

6 see McPhail (1987) for an explanation of Canada's
media being an example of developing journalism due to the
presence of the U.S. (esp. pg. 24-32).
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exports to the U.S. was considered a deplorable tactic for
decreasing pressure on U.S. companies who wanted to invest
in Canada.
sentiments.

This had the obvious effect of more anti-u.s.
There was one area of agreement between some

citizens of Canada and the U.S.:

Disapproval of Vietnam.

New Democratic Party members in Ottawa put on a
demonstration to show their support for U.S. antiwar
protesters.

Still, this show of solidarity seemed to do

little for the overall public sentiment in regard to the
U.S.
Even with the continued feelings of anxiety toward
U.S. investments, some Canadian officials began fearing
Canada's anti-U.S. policies.

At least half of the Premiers

noted that Canada could not become self-sufficient and
needed U.S. financial support.

The Niagara Institute for

International Studies was also formed to develop a better
understanding of u.s.-canada relations in hope of quelling
some of the fears.

Trudeau even called on Nixon to help

Canada get out from under U.S. influence, though both said
they would continue to work on close ties between the two
countries.
The two sides to this issue seemed to make Trudeau
schizophrenic when it came to U.S. relations, though his
Liberal Party was seen as pushing for more economic
nationalism.

Some saw Trudeau as more nationalistic than

his immediate predecessor -- L.B. Pearson.

In regards to

the Development Corporation, Trudeau felt it was imperative
that this organization get up and running to curb U.S.
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investments.

He then turned around and said the two

countries must work for closer ties.

When Nixon made it

public that he was going to visit Peking, Trudeau said that
he was always one step ahead of Nixon; this was after he
had asked Nixon to help Canada get out from under U.S.
influence.

The two leaders exchanged visits during the

year, and the governments signed an extradition treaty on
assailants of diplomats.

When it came to U.S. relations

(especially in the area of investments), Canadians were
beginning to get a mixed signal from their Prime Minister.
Other foreign policy was more clear.

Though early in

the year China said it was not ready to buy American
imports, the two countries did exchange ambassadors before
year's end.

Relations with the U.S.S.R. also continued, as

Trudeau made a visit to the u.s.S.R., and entertained
Soviet Premier Aleksei Nikolayevich, who was thought to be
hoping to show that Canada could have other friends in the
global community (besides the U.S.).

Though Nikolayevich

was met with protesters in parts of Canada (over the
U.S.S.R.'s human rights record), Canada and the u.s.s.R.
signed an amity pact, and agreed to industrial cooperation.
These moves were seen as both positive and detrimental for
Canada-u.s. relations.

Some felt that it was yet another

sign of Canadian independence, while others feared it would
split the two countries with Trudeau spending too much time
courting the U.S.S.R.
sentiments.

Trudeau disagreed with these latter

Plus, after a European-owned bank opened its
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doors for business, Canadians saw signs of extended
European ties, easing fears of a total turn to the u.s.s.R.
Military Activities
Canada did not engage in any type of warfare during
the three years under study, though she did continue her
membership in NATO and participated in joint military
activities with the U.S.

This included a Distant Early

Warning Line, an affirmation that the defense of North
America was the second highest mission of Canada's Armed
Forces, and drills involving joint bomber runs over
Canadian air space. The use of Canadian air space, though,
was also an area of contention.

The U.S. wanted to have

access to Canadian air space for its anti-ballistic
missiles, but was turned down and told by Defense Minister
Donald

s.

MacDonald that Canada would link with the U.S. in

all military concerns, except in an antiballistic missile
system. 7
The U.S. was eager to use Canada's North Bay military
base as an alternate air defense base, but this request was
denied as well.

The U.S. also berated Canada for not

carrying more of the financial load of protecting North
America after it cut military spending in 1969.

Canada,

partly in response to the U.S. asking it to share more the
burden of North American military defense, increased its

7Just ten years earlier (1961), sixty-one percent of
Canadians believed Canada's military should be equipped
with nuclear weapons (Gallup, 1972).
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military budget in 1971 by $18 million, though the U.S.
complained that this was still not enough.

Canadian

officials said there were better ways to spend money.
Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment
Rising inflation between 1969 and 1971 had many
Canadian workers worried about their futures.

Inflation

was not the only factor blamed on rising unemployment -u. s. investment was carrying part of the blame as well,
with U.S.-owned companies being accused of downsizing and
as fronts for U.S. exports to Canada.
Trudeau's foreign investment policies have already
been reported, so I now turn to his anti-inflationary
policies, which directly affected workers.

Trudeau decided

the best way to def eat inflation was to enact a voluntary
wage freeze, which labor leaders and workers contested.
These policies were expected to have a large impact on the
1972 elections, while inflation and unemployment continued
to rise (though unemployment did level off somewhat in
1971).
The worries over inflation and unemployment also
caused worker unrest during the three years under
investigation.

over 500 strikes were reported each year

(see TABLE VI, page 59), including a Ford Canada walkout in
1969 (to respect other United Auto Worker picket lines),
and another strike in 1971 over wages and other benefits. 8

8unfortunately, Marton did not include this as part of
her study of Ford Canada workers. This is the kind of
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Air Canada workers -- who are government employees -- also
struck in 1969.

In addition, Quebec was a breeding ground

for worker unrest, mainly due to the separatist activies in
that Province.

I now turn to these activities.

Quebec
Though Quebec itself played no larger role in foreign
relations/investment than did other Canadian Provinces, the
separatist activities there were a major part of the
Canadian social and political landscape during the years
under consideration.

Strikes and political activies in

1969 were the harbingers of more extreme activities in
1970.

These activities may have been exacerbated when

France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs turned down
an invitation to visit Ottawa after a trip to Quebec.
By 1970, some of the more extreme separatists had
resorted to the kidnapping and murdering of government
officials.

Trudeau, in retaliation to these offenses,

evoked emergency wartime powers.

U.S. and French officials

praised him for his actions, though some Canadians
criticized him for using too much force too quickly.
Extremist activities in Quebec had died down by 1971,
though rising unemployment was the cause for some worker
unrest in the region.
of Quebec's future.

Many Canadians were still uncertain
It seemed that the Canadian and French

oversight that needs to be corrected in social science
studies, as people's attitudes are treated as if they were
formed in a vacuum instead of a society.
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governments had come closer to seeing eye-to-eye on the
importance of maintaining a united Canada.

By mid-1971,

Trudeau and the rest of Canada seemed to have brought
Quebec back into Canadian line.
Quantitative Data
TABLES IV, v, and VI contain the quantitative data for
Canada.
TABLE IV
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA, CANADA 1967-1971 9
Year

GNP(millions U.S.$)

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

48,649.5
51,099.110
55,885.9
79,130.0
89,320.0

GNP per capita (U.S.$)
2380
2460
2650
3700
4140

TABLE V
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, CANADA 1967-1971 11
Year

Unemployment Rate

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

3.8
4.5
4.4
5.7
6.2

9 source: World Bank Atlas, 1969-1973. GNP and GNP
per capita figues for all countries are not adjusted for
inflation, but are in absolute (current) figures.
10 The GNP for 1967-1969 were estimated by using
population and GNP per capita.
11 source, Kearl (1993)
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TABLE VI
NUMBER OF STRIKES AND WORKERS INVOLVED, CANADA 1969-1971 12

Year

# of strikes

1969
1970
1971

566
503
547

# of workers involved
306,799
266,706
239,631

Hypotheses. Predictions, and Data for Canadian Workers
I turn now to the supporting hypotheses that I stated
would predict the outcome of workers' attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs.
• The first would be that if national leaders
expressed positive attitudes toward foreign investment
and/or intervention, then workers would also show positive
attitudes.

The case here is not absolutely clear, since

Canada began diplomatic talks with Peking during the time
under study, courted the u.s.s.R., and stated that more
needed to be done in relations with other regions of the
world, such as Latin America and other Asian countries.
What is clear is the anti-u.s. views of the national
leaders.

Since a large majority of Canada's foreign

investment was from the U.S., it is safe to say that a
majority of Canada's foreign investment was viewed as
negative by national leaders, and, therefore, workers would
be predicted to have negative attitudes toward foreignowned MNCs.

12 source, Leacy (1983).
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• The second hypothesis was that any military
intervention (inward or outward) would lead workers to
espouse negative attitudes.

Since Canada's military was,

for the most part, inactive, except in joint practices with
the U.S. and in quelling some of the unrest in Quebec,
workers would not be affected by military activity in
regards to national or international feelings.
• The third supporting hypothesis stated that if
strike (or worker unrest) activities were high, then
workers would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned
MNCs.

Canadian strike activity was high each year of the

study, with over 500 strikes taking place each year.

Ford

Canada workers were involved in strikes in two of the years
(1969 and 1971).

This would give reason to believe,

according to this hypothesis, that the workers questioned
would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
• My fourth and fifth supporting hypotheses concerned
GNP and GNP per capita.

The former stated that if GNP was

rising, then workers would have positive attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs.

The latter stated that if GNP per

capita were shrinking or not rising as fast as GNP, then
workers would have negative attitudes.

GNP and GNP per

capita did rise each year, though GNP rose faster than GNP
per capita.

Thus, though GNP was growing (creating a

stronger economy) workers were not enjoying the same
percentage of growth in their incomes.

Therefore, workers

would be envisioned to have negative attitudes, though this
would be tempered by the rise in both economic indicators.
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The sixth hypothesis stated that if the country in
question experienced high unemployment

(~

6%), then workers

would have positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
Since Canada experienced high unemployment only one of the
years (1971), workers would not be predicted to have strong
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs, though the
last year of high unemployment may have moved some workers
to be grateful for the work.
A combination of the six supporting hypotheses
predicts negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
None of the conditions documented gave workers reason to
have positive attitudes, though circumstances relevant to
the second and sixth hypothesis were neutral.

From a

social identity theory perspective, Canadian workers would
view MNCs as negative if they are non-economic persons.
This is the result that was obtained from the actual
questionnaires (which was administered by Marton at the
Ford plant. 13 TABLE VII (page 64) shows the percentage of
responses to a question concerning the overall attitudes of
the workers. 14

13 The number of workers who participated in the
Canadian study was 100.
14 The actual question was: "What is the overall
effect on Canada of the activities of foreign companies in
Canada?" (Marton, 1982, pg. 85). Responses were
operationalized on a seven-point Likert-type scale, with
possible responses ranging from bad (1) to good (7).
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Fifty-six percent of the workers had negative
attitudes toward MNCs, while only thirty-one percent had
positive attitudes.

Thirteen percent were noncommittal.
TABLE VII

WORKERS' OVERALL EVALUATION OF MNCS IN CANADA15
% of respondents

Rating
1 (bad)

39

12
5
13
20

2

3
4 (neutral)
5

6

6

5

7 (good)

To analyze the variation in overall attitudes among the
workers, it was regressed on nine evaluative beliefs:
MNCs' 1) influence on Canadians way of life (X 1 ) , 2)
working conditions (X 2 ), 3) wages (X 3 ), 4) recognition of
unions (X 4 ), 5) effect on Canada's economy (X 5 ), 6) future
effects (X 6 ), 7) involvement in national affairs (X 7 ), 8)
acting contrary to Canadian interests (X 8 ), and 9) moneys
other than wages (X 9 ). 16
By forming a multiple regression analysis of all nine
beliefs, the following unstandardized regression equation

= -.85 +

.2sx 1 + .25X 2 + .06X 3 + .17X4 +
.35X 5 + .18X 6 + .20X 7 + .05X 8 + .42X 9 ,

was produced:

o

15 source for all the tables for the Canadian workers
are from Marton, 1982.
16 Respondents answered each question on a seven-point

Likert scale (as in the "overall responses").
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where o is the overall attitude of the workers.
This equation produced a multiple correlation
coefficient with overall attitudes toward foreign
investment of .85, so R2 = .7225. This equation, though,
had intercorrelated variables, and after computing t-values
for the betas, Marton found that only three were
significant at the .05 level --

x1 , x5 ,

and

x9 ,

with

x1

explaining the most variance (R 2 for this variable was .60
in a stepwise regression analysis). 17
Since x 1 -- MNC influence on way of life -- explained
sixty percent of the variation between respondents, it
would seem that a powerful case could be made that there is
a strong relationship between nationalism and attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs.

But are Ford Canada workers

more nationalistic than their fellow Canadians?

In a

survey conducted the same year as the Ford Canadian study,
5000 Canadians were asked if they harbored negative
attitudes toward U.S. investments.

Only thirty-nine
percent (1970 respondents) were outright negative. 18

This

is a large difference, and suggests a exacerbation effect

17 standardizing the betas may have given us even more
insight into the effects of each of the beliefs, but this
was not included in Marten's study (nor was the information
needed to perform the calculations, so the results could
not be checked). The t-values, though, do give us an
estimate of what linear relations may be found in the
population (assuming this was all Canadian workers in
"blue-collar" positions within foreign-owned MNCs).
18 rf a chi-square test of independence were conducted
using the two groups, the significance level would be above
ninety-nine percent.
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of working within a foreign-owned MNC.

(This is not to say

that causation has been found in either direction, but to
point out the strong relationship between nationalism and
negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 19 ) I turn
now to Brazil to find out if workers employed within
foreign-owned MNCs there had the same attitudes toward
their employers as did the Canadian workers.
BRAZIL
General History
Brazil proclaimed its independence from Portugal in
1822, and has struggled to shake the effects of its
colonial past ever since.

This has not been easy.

Though

Brazil boasts the largest land area and population of any
country in South America, which means both large raw
material deposits and an ample supply of labor power, it
has not been able to develop without the help of foreign
investment.

This has usually come in the form of

19 A linear relation between nationalism and employment
within MNCs (or any other variable) becomes even more
problematic when nationalism is studied across age and
temporal boundaries. In a survey involving Canadian high
school students conducted in 1968, over 60 percent of the
respondents said that U.S. interests hold too much control
over Canadian resources (Forbes, 1985), but another study
done around 1964 found a nearly unanimous acceptance of
U.S. investments among English-speaking Canadian college
students (Clark, 1965). Social identification theory
approaches these different intensities of nationalism by
searching for positive self identification factors, which
makes linear relations less problematic. (In other words,
the intensity of nationalism starts within the person or
group based on societal factors; see Chapter VI below for a
further explanation.)
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investments by MNCs (mostly from the U.S., though in no way
has it been confined only to the U.S.) (Horowitz, 1964).
In 1960, Brazil became a member of the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

As with most integrated

trade pacts, LAFTA was formed with a desire to strengthen
the individual nations' economic situations.

Shortly after

LAFTA was formed, Brazil emerged as the economic leader,
which led to small rivalries with some of the other nations
involved, such as Argentina and Chile.

This continued into

the '70s as will be seen shortly (Jones, 1991).

In spite

of these small rivalries, LAFTA stayed intact.
Though LAFTA had some success in helping Brazil's
economy grow, it took a military coup in 1964 to make it
really expand.

The coup was brought about by high

inflation, which in turn caused worker strikes and riots.
This unstable situation may have caused U.S. investors in
Brazil to help finance the coup, as the U.S. Navy
dispatched ships to back the coup.

The ships never made it

that far, as the coup was successfully completed within a
couple of days (Shoumatoff, 1980).
Before and after the coup, the U.S. had been the
largest foreign investor in Brazil (and this has
continued).

According to Horowitz (1964), this made the

U.S. a scapegoat for Brazilian nationalists.

Even though

U.S. companies were undoubtedly the best taxpayers, as well
as the best wage payers in Brazil, this had not made them
any more welcome.

As a matter of fact, an ex-President of

Brazil, Janio Quardos, wrote that Brazil must get out from
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under U.S. control (Horowitz, 1964).
written before 1964.

All of this was

The Brazilian workers involved in the

study were questioned in 1974.

How many, if any, changes

occurred during those ten years?
Before I outline the events in Brazil from 1972
through 1974, it should be noted that many outside of
Brazil felt that it was the perfect country for foreign
direct investment.

LaPalombara and Blank (1984) even named

a model for foreign investment the "Brazilian model,"
commenting that other countries could learn from what
Brazil had done.

They pointed out that a major reason for

this success was the military regime and the amount of
governmental support for already existing MNCs.

Others

hailed Brazil's economic growth in the early and mid 1970's
as an economic miracle, as its GNP rapidly increased
throughout these years (Brockway, 1993, Larrain, 1989).

It

was only after the mid 70's that social scientists
recognized that, as with most developing countries, this
success was achieved at the expense of the bottom half of
the nation's population (actually more than half, as more
Brazilians were below the average income than above).

The

gap between rich and poor was widening at the same rate the
GNP was rising (Maxcy, 1981).
Politics
Nineteen-hundred-seventy-two marked the 150th
anniversary of Brazilian independence.

Many celebrations

were planned and carried out with the hope of stirring
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public pride in Brazil.

While this may be interpreted as a

showing of nationalistic pride, Brazil's economic growth at
this time was, in fact, fueled by foreign investment.
Brazil entered 1972 coming off the best year in its
economic history with an increase in GNP of eleven percent.
This was helped by several billion dollars of both domestic
and foreign investment.

To continue this growth, Brazilian

officials decided to continue to invite foreign companies
to begin operations in Brazil.

This was not only for

continued economic strength, but also as a source of jobs.
Even though pollution caused by such companies (many were
natural resource ventures such as paper/pulp mills and
mining extractors) was the cause for some concern, highranking Brazilian officials felt that this was not a worry
at the time, and when it did become a problem the rich
industrial countries would clean it up -- since they were
the ones that caused it (through their subsidiaries).
Though the U.S. was the major foreign investor in
Brazil in 1972, 20 and even sent a group of officials to
study Brazil's economic growth, other countries saw this
South American country as a target for investments as well.
Japan set up a paper/pulp mill in Brazil during 1972, and
sent a national mission there to investigate investment
opportunities and economic cooperation between the two

20 u.s. companies saw Brazil as a good place to set up
operations as they fought high wages and stringent
pollution controls at home.
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countries.

Japan had close to 700,000 expatriates in

Brazil in 1972.

In all, it was estimated that over one

billion dollars of new foreign investment and bank loans
entered Brazil in 1972. 21
Brazil was also looking outward at this time.

The

Brazilian government put pressure on foreign-owned MNCs to
look for new markets for export goods.

The Brazilian

leaders said this was the price to pay for continued
incentives given to MNCs.

Africa was even courted as a

possible partner for economic cooperation, as were Latin
America countries.

Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu

Medici signed a law creating new Brazilian trading
companies based on the Japanese model.

The companies were

to be Brazilian owned, though foreign partners were free to
join as long as majority ownership was Brazilian.
Many within and outside of Brazil saw these
proceedings as Brazil's move to become the leader of the
Third World.

There were critics, however.

The Roman

Catholic Church and the Government feuded over the
treatment of native populations, as The Church accused the
government of displacing these people by allowing MNCs to
expand into Brazil's rain forests.

Others saw Brazil's

21 Both the U.S. and Japan sent loans to Brazil in
1972. The U.S. Export-Import Bank announced two one
million dollar loans so Brazilians could ~urchase U.S.
goods and services in heavy machinery, while Japan issued
over $32 million dollars worth of bonds on behalf of the
Brazilian government during the year {it should be noted
that this did come after suspension of 3 Brazilian bonds on
the New York Stock Exchange).
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economic growth as a way to continue low wages and military
oppression.

When Amnesty International made claims of

torture against the Brazilian government, the u.s.
threatened to end military aid. 22 Further, many in the
Latin American community pushed for Brazil to end its Cuban
Boycott and increase trade with the U.S.S.R.

This latter

development may have been hindered when possible

u.s.s.R.

informants were arrested for subversion against the
Brazilian government.

Finally, in an act that was seen as

a move to strain British-Brazilian ties, a British sailor
on shore leave in Sao Paulo was attacked and killed by
rebel guerrillas.

It did little good.

Brazilian officials continued to encourage FDI in
1973, as Brazil continued its quest to become a developed
nation.

Though many in Brazil hoped to do this with less

dependence on FD! (true economic progress was seen to be
linked to national pride), others in Brazil looked to
Japan, Europe, and the U.S. for continued support.

Japan

was held as a model of economic achievement given its fall
and rise after WWII.

MNCs from other countries seemed to

be more than happy to continue to take advantage of
Brazil's raw materials and large (cheap) labor force.
Foreign relations with the U.S. were apparently not
hindered by the threat of withdraw of military aid made in

22 This may have been of little concern at the time, as
$59 million worth of air traffic control and air defense
radar systems had been purchased from the French in 1972.
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1972.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. sent jet fighters to

Brazil to help in military matters.

U.S. President Richard

Nixon noted that Brazil was the natural leader for Latin
America and began building new ties with Brazil.

There

was, however, one small problem with relations between the
two countries that occurred over the sale of real estate.
A deal that was to involve the U.S. selling an old embassy
building to West Germany was vetoed by the Brazilian
government.

The sale was seen as a tax evasion measure on

the part of the U.S. participants.

This may have caused a

small rift in U.S.-Brazilian ties, but one would have to
wonder how much it would have affected the general public,
especially since nothing more came of it (no threats to
invade Brazil or pull all aid from that country).
While U.S. relations continued to be mostly friendly
through 1973 and Brazil continued to look to other
developed countries as a way to continue its economic
progress, relations with other Latin American countries
were deteriorating.

After Nixon's statement regarding

Brazil's leadership potentials, relations with Argentina
began to cool.

Other Latin American countries saw Brazil

as becoming imperialistic, especially towards its closest
neighbors.

Brazilian officials shot back with statements

that it was being used as a scapegoat for the problems
experienced in these other Latin American countries.
Relations with some other countries were also becoming
problematic.
concern.

Japan became the target for some government

Fears of pollution and natural resource depletion
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caused the Brazilian government to insist that a new
Japanese factory use the most advanced pollution control
devices in the construction of the plant.

Though this did

not move the Japanese to withdraw from Brazil, it can be
seen as a move towards more control over FDI.

It was also

feared that boycotts by Arabs, or any cutbacks in energy
supplies from them, would trigger a halt to Brazil's
economic growth.

The National Monetary Council of Brazil

ordered a forty percent reduction in the foreign exchange
reserves held in Brazilian banks (estimated to be at $6.4
billion U.S. dollars).

These funds were seen as having

adverse affects on inflation.
Though Brazil experienced the largest gain in GNP
(eleven percent) of any major nation in 1973, it did begin
to experience an economic slowdown toward the end of 1973
and the beginning of 1974 (a trend that was to continue).
This slowdown was blamed mainly on a balance of payment
problem stemming from dependence on imported oil. 23
Brazilian officials (led by newly selected President
General Ernesto Geisel) began courting Arab investments,
hoping to lower the balance of payment debt and ensure that
no boycotts within this sector would happen.

Arab bankers

and industrialists took this opportunity to look seriously
into investing in Brazil.

Some inside and outside Brazil

were beginning to question Geisel's open arms policy, much

23 Approximately eighty percent of Brazil's oil was
being imported at this time.
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of this criticism stemming from a growing concern over the
environment.
Brazil's foreign relations under Geisel seemed to
become somewhat more disorganized, though many still saw
Brazil as having the potential of becoming a world power.
U.S. relations continued to be strong for the most part, 24
as First Lady Pat Nixon was a guest at Geisel's
inauguration, and Brazil looked towards U.S. investments as
a possible solution to its growing economic problems.
There was some worry over trade barriers between the two
countries, especially after Brazilian officials accused the
U.S. of trying to place import duties on Brazilian shoes.
Nixon sent a top advisor to Brazil to iron out the
differences.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seemed to

have done little to promote relations.

He was given a

lukewarm warm welcome when he visited Brazil later in the
year.

(This was mainly due to Kissinger's public backing

of the Netherlands' soccer team during a Netherlands-Brazil
soccer contest the preceeding year.)

24 There were two isolated incidents involving U.S.
citizens in Brazil that could have hindered ties. A U.S.
journalist was arrested after interviewing outgoing
Brazilian President Juan Domingo Peron. This arrest was
based on charges of incriminated evidence of the ruling
military party -- evidence that had reportedly been made up
by the journalist. The second incident involved a U.S.
businessman who was arrested and supposedly tortured over
charges of stealing monies. Though U.S. officials demanded
humane treatment from Brazilian officials, the incidents
seemed to have had little impact on ties between the
countries.
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Brazil was still seen as an up and coming power in
Latin America, especially by Argentina.

Geisel and his

officials continually denied these charges, saying Brazil
was not out for power, but trying to develop economically.
Nevertheless, Argentinean officials continued to be
outspoken critics of Brazil.

Paraguay and Bolivia were

pursued in the hopes of establishing economic ties.

Brazil

and Bolivia even signed an economic cooperation pact, and
Geisel used this as a start towards Latin American
solidarity and integration.

He was met with student

protests in Bolivia shortly after the pact was signed.
These students were concerned about Brazil's perceived
power and militaristic government.
Brazil established ties with Communist China in 1974,
though, as with Canada's ties with Communist China, this
came at the cost of losing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
With ties to Peking, Brazil was hoping to buy Chinese coal,
chemical products, and oil.

Though it was not explicitly

mentioned, it was a move to reduce her reliance on Middle
East oil.

Also, Brazil pursued possible joint ventures

with the Chinese in steel production.
communist countries, such as the

In addition, other

u.s.s.R.,

were approached,

though no such breakthrough was made with Cuba.

Arabs were

looking into investments in Brazil as well, though progress
here was tied to Brazilian officials' willingness to back
the Arabs' conflict with Israel.

In an international

development, Brazil sent a contingent to fight for the
right to continue population growth at the U.N. World
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Population Conference -- this was the opposite stance from
most other Third World countries, a move that could be
viewed as nationalistic.
Military Activities
Military operations during the period under study were
mainly limited to fighting anti-government guerrillas.
Very few military regimes in the Third World are safe from
guerrilla actions aimed at overthrowing the current regime.
Though this action was small in 1972, it was to pick up
later.
Military activity involving Brazilian forces continued
to be focused internally in 1973 and 1974.

Though the

Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (the largest Brazilian
guerrilla organization) was disbanded early in 1973,
guerrilla forces continued to plague the military, and at
one point these groups threatened to kidnap the daughter of
U.S. Vice President Sipro Agnew.

The only other major

military activity was that of the U.S. jets being sent to
Brazil (mentioned above).

This purchase (and other

purchases of U.S. weapons) were seen by some within Brazil
as a way to continue to oppress the people.
When Geisel entered the Presidency in 1974, he
promised a relaxation of military censorship over the
media, though this did not last long.

He also made it

known that the military was his number one priority.
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Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment
Worker unrest and strikes were a factor in the
national landscape, though militant unions and strikes were
illegal during the period under discussion.

There is no

quantifiable data for strikes during this time.

Several

work stoppages were reported, though the reports were
censored.

Reports of such work stoppages did point out

that most took place in the modern sector, a sector heavily
saturated with foreign-owned MNCs, including pulp and paper
mills -- the industry used to gather data for Brazil
(Sandoval, 1993). 25
The Roman catholic Church played a major role in the
worker uprisings.

The Church continually accused the

government of perpetuating low wages and poor living
conditions for much of the population.

They even said that

workers were ready to physically confront the government if
necessary.
Quantitative Data
TABLES VIII, and IX and contain the quantitative data
for Brazil (page 78).

25 To give an idea of the political landscape of Brazil
during the years under investigation, in 1972, 18 deaths
were reported alon9 with four disappearances; 1973, 16
deaths and seven disappearances; 1974, O deaths, 13
disappearances (Sandoval, 1993).
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TABLE VIII
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA, BRAZIL 1970-1974 26
Year

GNP(millions U.S.$)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

GNP per capita(U.S.$)

38,470
44,260
52,010
76,950
97,250

420
460
530
760
940
TABLE IX

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES, BRAZIL 1970-1974 27
Year

Population

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

92,237,570
95,170,000
97,850,000
100,560,000

# of unemployed (x 1000)

725.0
723.0
1,033.9
968.0

Hypotheses. Predictions and Data for Brazilian Workers
I turn now to the supporting hypotheses.
• The first, that if national leaders express
positive attitudes toward foreign investment and/or
intervention, then workers will show positive attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs, would predict positive
attitudes.

Brazilian leaders between 1972 and 1974 were

heavily in favor of foreign-owned MNCs, seeing these
organizations as essential to continued economic growth.

26 source, World Bank Atlas, 1972-1976.
27 source, Wilkie (1980). Brazil did not report
unemployment rates during these years, though from 1970 to
1973 the number of unemployed workers was reported. For
this reason, I will give population and unemployed figures
for each of these years. No figures were reported for
1974.
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The sentiment of U.S. domination expressed by Horowitz
seems to either have been reified or dissipated within the
ten years between his writings and the time under study.
Also, other countries were openly courted for economic
reasons.
• The second supporting hypothesis, that if the
country were experiencing either inward or outward military
intervention, then workers would have negative attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs, would show that there was little
activity (that involved another country) in this area for
workers to be concerned.
• The third supporting hypothesis is blurred in this
case.

If a country experienced over 200 strikes during any

of the years under study, then workers would view foreignowned MNCs as negative.

Unfortunately, strikes were

illegal, and worker unrest and strikes during this time
were not reported.

It is probably safe to say that in no

year were there 200 strikes, but this may not be due to
worker satisfaction, but due to the legality of strikes.
It would seem that workers were not too unhappy, since
there were no major worker riots during this time, but this
cannot be backed by fact.
• The fourth supporting hypothesis, that if GNP was
rising, then workers would have positive attitudes toward
foreign-owned MNCs, anticipates positive attitudes within
the working class.

GNP grew each year by over ten percent.

Plus, Brazil was praised as having the highest rise in GNP
of any major nation in 1973 (reported in 1974).
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• The fifth supporting hypothesis, that if GNP per
capital was shrinking or not growing as fast as GNP, then
workers would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned
MNCs.

As can be seen, GNP per capita was not growing as

fast as GNP, though it was not too far behind.

Based on

this, workers would be predicted to have negative
attitudes, though they would not be extreme.
• The sixth supporting hypothesis states that if
unemployment rates are high, then workers will have
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.

Though

unemployment statistics for Brazil (and any developing
country) are suspect, it is true that unemployment was high
during the time under investigation (and continues to be
so).

Since foreign-owned MNCs were offering employment in

an environment of high unemployment, workers would be
envisioned to have positive attitudes toward foreign-owned
MNCs.
By combining the above hypotheses (leaving out the
third), it would appear that workers in Brazil would
espouse positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
is what was found by Blake and Driscoll (1982).

This

They asked

Brazilians who were directly and indirectly employed by two
u.s.-owned paper/pulp mills 28 , as well as other Brazilian
nationals, about the impact of the mills on the local
communities.

TABLE X (page 81) contains their findings.

28 The two mills were owned by Olinkraft and Westvaco.
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TABLE X
ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNITY IMPACT OF TWO U.S.
PAPER/PULP MILLS OPERATING IN BRAZIL (percentage) 29
Plant

# of Respondents

Very Positive

Positive

Olinkraft

119

61.4

37.5

Westvaco

108

84.4

14.3

Their findings leave little question as to the
importance of these two paper/pulp mills to the Brazilian
citizens.

TABLE XI contains the percentages of respondents

who found different aspects of the mills to have positive
impacts on their communities when asked about the mills in
open-ended interviews.
TABLE XI
POSITIVE ASPECTS OF COMPANIES' EFFECT ON COMMUNITY
(percentage)
Aspect

Percentage of responses (n = 290)

Employment
Adds to community life
Industrial development
Taxes and other services
Generates other business
Positive work environment
Technology transfer
Reforestation
Provides products

37.9
16.9
14.5
9.0
6.6
4.8
4.5
3.1
2.8

These findings can be compared with responses to negative
aspects of the mills in TABLE XII (page 82). 30

29
All Tables dealing with the Brazilian workers can be
found in Blake and Driscoll (1982). Also, percentages may
not be equal to one hundred due to rounding.
30
The open-ended interviews asked respondents to
discuss both positive and negative aspects of the mills. A
majority of the respondents then had to be asked again
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TABLE XII
NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF COMPANIES ON COMMUNITY, STATES {OF
BRAZIL) OR BRAZIL

Percentage of responses (n = 195)

Aspect

No harm
Pollution
Don't know, no answer, or neutral
Local problems
Only one kind of tree replanted

46.7
30.8

16.9
3 .6

2.1

There can be very little doubt that there are both
quantitative and qualitative differences between the Ford
Canadian workers and the Brazilian paper/pulp mill workers.
The Brazilian workers were skewed heavier to one side of
the scale of attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs than the
Canadian workers, i.e. there seemed to be a larger
consensus among Brazilians in regards to foreign-owned
MNCs.

And, of course, the Brazilians were much more

positive towards foreign-owned MNCs than the Candians.
Does this mean that Brazilians are less nationalistic than
Canadians?

To answer this question, I need to return

briefly to the label "nationalism."

If nationalism is

considered a type of group paranoia, as Kis (1992) seems to
think, then the Canadian workers could be considered more
nationalistic (more negative toward inward foreign
investment).

If nationalism is an expression of national

pride (as in the Brazilians' support for their national
soccer team) and well-being (no matter what the means),

about negative aspects only, as they would only talk about
the positive aspects.
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then no such assumption can be made. 31

Instead, the idea

that working for a foreign-owned MNC could exacerbate
nationalistic feelings can again be tested with the
Brazilian study.

All categories of Brazilian respondents

were in favor of the foreign-owned MNCs, but when attitudes
of employees and suppliers were compared to those not
employed (directly or indirectly) by the MNCs, the former
were much more positive on most aspects of the MNCs (not
all the differences were statistically significant, though
in all cases the employees were more positive).

Is there

then a MNC effect, as the two cases presented so far
suggests?

I now turn to the third group of workers -- West

German managers employed within MNCs, to
see if the pattern continues.

WEST GERMANY
General History
At the end of WWII, a person evaluating nationalism
within West Germany would probably have said that Germans
were too nationalistic and nothing would change them.

This

31
It is hard to have much confidence in studies that
show that nationalism is evenly distributed throughout
society. In a study done in 1948, in which people were
asked if their country held the greatest opportunity to
pursue the "good-life," responses ranged from ninety-six
percent in the U.S. to thirty percent in West Germany
(Doob, 1964). Obviously these responses were tempered by
temporal factors, yet it shows the large differences such
abstract (though real) attitudes can take across society,
not only in the number of people who are nationalistic, but
the intensity of nationalism as well.
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could have been based on the fact that Germany had been the
aggressor in two major wars (WWI and WWII) within the past
twenty-six years (from the beginning of WWI to the end of
WWII), with their end goal being global domination (as well
as racial domination in the latter war).

This

nationalistic image could be further increased by the split
between East and West Germany, making West Germany the
first line of defense against the Warsaw Pact countries. 32
Though West Germany may have had many reasons to be
nationalistic, she seems to have been trying, since the end
of WWII, to shed her past image, as can be clearly seen in
her Ostpolitik. 33 Shortly after WWII, West Germany's
postwar Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, told the French
(Germany's long-time rival) that Germany's fate was tied to
that of Western Europe (Pfaff, 1993).

West Germany was

given back its sovereignty in 1955 (Stahl, 1963).

Since

then, West Germany has been the driving force behind the
European Economic Community (EC).
The rise of West Germany's economic strength can be
tied to the U.S. Marshall Plan which helped rebuild West

32
It should be noted that this split was not brought
about by the German people, but by the ideologies of the
leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Though West Germany
is a member of the former and East Germany was a member of
the latter, their roles were manipulated by other members
of the pacts (Kennedy, 1987). This became evident when
both Germanys celebrated the falling of the Berlin Wall.
33 ostpolitik is a policy or agenda aimed at reunifying
the two Germanys, as well as European reconciliation in
economic and political affairs (Jones, 1991).
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Germany's industrial infrastructure after WWII (Stahl,
1963).

Since that time, West Germany has become one of the

most prosperous nations in the world (Brockway, 1963), and
the third largest producer of motor vehicles in the world
(Maxcy, 1981). 34
Though West Germany is (or seems to be) trying to
shake its nationalistic reputation, it has not always been
helped by its Western European neighbors.

In the 1970's

there was a push in West Germany to create more MNCs within
Western Europe, but the effort was met with stiff
resistance -- mainly in the form of nationalism and
"Germanphobia."

There were some exceptions, such as Volvo,

but for the most part foreign-owned MNCs were seen as
neocolonialistic (Maxcy, 1981).
Politics
By 1974, West Germany had the largest economy in
Europe, along with a low unemployment rate (1.6%) (Kearl,
1993), 35 but this was rising and workers were threatening
nationwide strikes.

West Germany also boasted a record

trade surplus of $10.8 billion, which was helped by 2.6

34 The reason I focus on automobile manufacturing is
that this is an industry that not only gives some idea of
the strength of a nation, but also tends to be suited for
multinational endeavors. If a country has a strong
automobile sector, it is probably a strong home nation for
MNCs. The facts seem to support this, as the U.S. is
number one, Japan second, and West Germany third. All
three have many home-based MNCs.
35 west Germany had the second lowest unemployment rate
of any major country in 1974. Japan was lower at 1.4%.
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million foreign workers.

West Germany was home of the

second largest military force in NATO, and she had the
founder of Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt, as her Chancellor
until March.
West Germany was rocked by the resignation of
Chancellor Brandt in 1974. 36 Brandt had been elected
Chancellor in 1969. During his time in office he
continually pushed for German reunification, a unified
Europe (in the form of the EC), and detente with the

u.s.s.R. and other Eastern European nations.

Before he

left office in March, Brandt backed an agreement that gave
West German and

u.s.s.R. entrepreneurs the chance to join

forces in setting up joint companies in Third World
countries.

In spite of these events, some thought his

efforts to build relations with the
down by this time.

u.s.s.R. had slowed

Brandt felt that talks would only

succeed if the ideological barriers between East and West
were dropped.

Brandt was also planning on increasing West

German purchases of other EC partners' products to help
boost their economies.

He oversaw the passage of a bill

that gave West German workers a larger voice in business (a
move from one-third of representation on company boards to
one-half) and a newly created government-run system of
profit-sharing.

Though workers and labor leaders hailed

this new law, business leaders said it would be too

36 As was East Germany.
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expensive.

This concern was echoed by U.S. businesses

operating in West Germany, which, in turn, gave West German
governmental officials a reason to accuse these u.s.
business leaders of meddling in West German affairs.
Brandt's resignation was brought about, in large part,
by an East German spy scandal that originated in Brandt's
office.

Whether a spy scandal would cause citizens to

become more or less nationalistic is open to debate (it
seems that this could be the basis for strong nationalism,
as one country would see another as meddling in its affairs
and jeopardizing its security), it did give officials of
the u.s.s.R. a chance to issue a report that this was a
major setback to East-West detente.

Not only was the spy

scandal a setback, but Brandt was the one Western leader
who had forged personal ties with u.s.s.R.'s leader Leonid
Brezhnev.
Brandt was succeeded by his Finance Minister Helmut
Schmidt.

Schmidt was expected to be friendlier to business

than Brandt, but many were not sure what his foreign
relations policy would be.

Shortly after entering the

Chancellor's office, Schmidt made it clear that he would
continue Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik.
Relations with the U.S. were nurtured by Schmidt. He
had visited the U.S. before becoming Chancellor, and
traveled there again in December.

He was pushing to have

the U.S. follow West Germany's move to drop antiinflationary policies and focus instead on unemployment
issues, and even welcomed u.s. investments.

Schmidt sent
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officials to Washington

o.c. to discuss military issues.

Schmidt seemed more inclined to having a strong military
presence in West Germany than did his predecessor.

Even in

his inaugural address he made a plea for U.S. military and
political presence in all of Europe, saying NATO was the
heart of Europe's and West Germany's security.

An

agreement expanding cooperation in environmental matters
was also signed between the U.S. and West Germany.

The

U.S. sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to West
Germany to continue talks on economic and defense issues.
One area of contention between the two countries arose over
the activity of the CIA.

West German officials viewed CIA

operatives in West Germany as acting without their consent.
When lists of spies were made known to West German
officials, it always came after investigations had been
done.
Schmidt visited the U.S.S.R. within his first year as
Chancellor, actually visiting there before traveling to the
U.S.

His talks centered around long-term economic

cooperation and trade.

With the U.S.S.R. rich in natural

resources, such as oil, coal, and natural gas -- resources
needed by an industrialized country -- and West Germany
rich in technical knowledge -- something needed by the
u.s.s.R. -- cooperation made good sense.
was the land between the two countries.

The only problem
Nations within

this area, especially East Germany, did not want power and
transportation lines linking West Germany and the u.s.s.R.
running across their lands.

u.s.s.R. officials traveled to
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West Germany at this time to continue talks over the
impasse.
Relations with France were expected to improve after
three hundred years of animosity.

One reason for this

optimism was that both countries had new leaders.

West

Germany had Schmidt, while France had a new President,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

The two leaders did meet, but

Schmidt found d'Estaing a weak leader, or at least
mentioned that he did not have enough domestic support in
France to help West Germany unify Europe.
strained once again. 37

Relations became

East Germany and West Germany seemed to be locked in a
love-hate relationship.

Though they exchanged permanent

representatives, East Germany removed all mention of German
reunification from its Constitution.

The two countries

even bickered over the ownership of museum pieces.

These

pieces had been displayed in what became East Germany
before WWII, but had been moved to West Germany by war's
end.

Still, from the West German point of view, the

emphasis was on reunification.
The final foreign relations aspect of 1974 involved
Middle East countries.

When Kuwaiti investors bought

37 This should not have come as a great surprise.
While still Finance Minister, Schmdit was backing pressure
from the U.S. on France to follow u.s.-generated energy
policies within NATO. France was apprehensive, feeling
that this would be a buckling to U.S. domination. France
was also being overlooked for help in European unification
during this time. Once again, the country looked to was
the U.S.
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fourteen percent of Daimler-Benz, West German officials and
business leaders began calling for tighter controls over
foreign investments.

These officials knew the importance

of Middle Eastern oil, but this very importance generated
concern.

The dependence on foreign oil had been an area of

concern for all industrialized countries after WWII, and
now the dollars being spent for that oil were showing back
up as petrodollars in West German companies.

Schmidt did

say Arabian investors were welcome, but the cry for control
over foreign investments would get louder in 1975.
There were two internal political events (other than
Brandt's resignation) that took place in 1974 that may have
had an effect on nationalist attitudes.

The first was the

formation of a new right-wing political party (Union of
Free Germany) that was to attract nationalists and other
conservatives.

Though the party opened with only about 300

members, it was reported that another 20,000 West Germans
had expressed an interest in joining.

The second event was

the discontinued observation of the anniversary of the June
17, 1963 uprising of workers in East Germany.

This day had

been seen as the day of unity for the two Germanys.
Schmidt was heavily criticized by workers and labor leaders
for his part in this matter. 38

38 This criticism was no doubt louder based on the fact
that Schmdit had promised to continue Brandt's
reunification policies.
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Relations with East Germany continued to be on
unstable ground in 1975.

Opposition leaders in the West

German government wanted Schmidt to refuse to sign the
closing Declaration of the European Security Conference
because they felt it did not guarantee the right for the
future reunification of the two Germanys.

East German

spies continued to plague West German security circles, and
kept NATO officials uneasy. 39 Schmidt, meanwhile,
continued to emphasize the need for strengthening relations
with East Germany (and other Eastern European countries),
saying it was fundamental to West German foreign policy.
Middle East investors continued to concern West German
officials as money continued to pour in from Kuwaiti and
Iran.

Bills were proposed to curb such investments

(especially in sensitive sectors), though these bills were
written so as to not affect investments originating in OECD
member countries. 40 This Middle East xenophobia was
certainly evident when a six man Saudi Arabian delegation
caused a stir during a West German business conference. 41
Saudi Arabians were also buying West German castles, which

39 A West German Air Force colonel was arrested for
spying for East Germany, and even Willy Brandt's son was
held for questioning.
40 schmidt went so far as to say that all major western
nations, including the U.S., were worried about Middle
Eastern investments.
41 The delegation was not asked to leave, but West
German business leaders were visibly nervous about their
presence.
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caused alarm in some circles.

Schmidt did meet with the

Shah of Iran -- a sign that some in West Germany felt the
need to keep some semblance of diplomatic ties with these
countries.
West German officials were becoming concerned with
their u.s.S.R. detente policy, saying that it was beginning
to slow, though it continued to be stable.

When the U.S.

and u.s.s.R. broke off a trade agreement, West German
officials were reported to be uneasy, but confident that
their position would be safe.

West German President Walter

Scheel did meet with Brezhnev to discuss exchanges of
technical and intellectual information, though little
progress was made.

These talks did little to solve the

continued debate over the border of West Berlin.

Voters

were also expressing their discontent over recent relations
.'

/

with the U.S.S.R.

Some elections were lost over this

issue, as West Germans began demanding (with their paper
stones) a stronger stance with the U.S.S.R., especially
concerning West Berlin.

Though voters may have wanted a

harder line, some German officials felt otherwise.

In a

move that some may have considered much too friendly,
military leaders in the u.s.s.R. were offered invitations
to observe West German military maneuvers.
One country that West Germany continued to turn to was
the U.S.

During the year, Kissinger met with Schmidt to

discuss economic issues (shortly after the two countries
and Japan pulled together to ward off pressure from the
International Monetary Fund to stimulate their economies),
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Scheel met with Ford to discuss defense issues, and Ford
met with Schmidt to coordinate efforts concerning Western
Europe's economic programs.
cause some waves.

U.S. business leaders did

Henry Ford II, during a visit to Ford

facilities in West Germany, lashed out at the
codetermination bill saying it would be bad for business,
but the bill still passed. Lockheed was accused of paying
off West German officials to promote the sales of its U.S.
manufactured aircraft.

In addition, an agreement to sell

nuclear technology to Brazil was met with stiff resistance
(Braunthal, 1977). Still, with the many meetings of top
officials 42 and the presence of U.S. troops in West
Germany, u.s.--West Germany relations were strong.
In other foreign relations, ties with France did
stabilize (for a short time), as Schmidt met again with
d'Estaing and agreed on a coordinated economic program.
France even ended celebrations commemorating its victory
over Germany in WWII.

Meanwhile, ties with Poland became

strained after Polish officials demanded reparations from
West Germany.

Relations with Spain were also put under

pressure after Schmidt sought to block the entrance of
Spain into NATO, saying it would be too much of an economic
burden.

China was courted, as Schmidt became the first

West German official to visit that country.

He signed an

42 Not only did the aforementioned meetings take place,
but Brandt also made a North American visit, stopping in
Mexico and the U.S.
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agreement after talks with Mao Tse-tung to establish a
joint trade commission.

Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin made

a visit to West Germany to discuss issues in his country in
which West Germany could have played a part.
Internal politics and activities kept West German
leaders busy as they approached a major election year.
Over one million workers were unemployed, and a trade
surplus of $22 billion began to fall.

Schmidt did try to

appease workers by saying they were the reason behind West
Germany's success as a European and world power.

Plus,

Schmidt was being plagued by terrorist activities, as the
West German embassy in Stockholm was stormed.

This was in

retaliation to the holding of terrorists in West German
prisons.
Nineteen-hundred-seventy-six was a major election year
in West Germany.

Schmidt was facing growing opposition

from Helmut Kohl and the conservatives.

Though he won the

election, his margin of victory was very slight (two House
votes).

During the campaign, Schmidt took every

opportunity to win the loyalties of the West German
workers, though he did refuse to nationalize West German
industry (Braunthal, 1977).

Unemployment did drop, though

this was still seen as a major problem during Schmidt's
term.

The codetermination law went into effect on July 1

(the elections were in October) which improved Schmidt's
position with the workers, but others in the business
sector felt that backlashes were inevitable as power was
given to the wrong people.

In addition, Schmidt said that
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humane working conditions were key to social peace and
stability.

Still, the narrow victory showed that not all
were won over by Schmidt. 43 This election also showed a
rejuvenation of neo-Nazis, who received 120,000 votes
(Braunthal, 1977.).
In foreign relations, West Germany found itself once
again being accused of interfering with its own economic
growth.

European neighbors and the IMF began putting

pressure on West Germany to boost its economy.

In Paris,

Amsterdam, and Stockholm people were found to still harbor
fears of Germany stemming from WWII, West Germany's growing
economic base, and its growing military.

The opposition

party (Christian Democrats) held Schmidt accountable for
these attitudes, pointing to his continuing assertion that
West Germany was the leading country in Western Europe. 44
He did make statements that he was putting West Germany in
a position to help other nations with their balance of
,,,·
'

payment problems.
Relations with the U.S. continued to be strong, with
Schmidt saying that relations had developed to the point of
being based on mutual trust.

His unemployment policies

43 A move by Volkswagen to begin manufacturing
transportation vehicles in the U.S. (to avoid high labor
costs and have a stronger market base in the U.S.) did
little to help Schmidt's campaign with workers. It was
seen as an exportation of jobs.
44 schmidt felt that West Germany was beginning to pull
away from the rest of Western Europe due to its growing
economic base and an unmatched aversion to communism.
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were seen only to be effective if they were coordinated
with those in the U.S., and he traveled there to discuss
economic issues, as well as issues pertaining to politics
and the military.

West Germans even celebrated the U.S.

bicentennial as if it were their own bicentennial.

U.S.

Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger made trips
to West Germany.

An article covering Kissinger's

statements on the role of the U.S. in Western Europe's
defense was even carried by a special edition of a West
German magazine.

It was even discovered that the CIA and

West German intelligence officials had been working closely
together, though this did not make all West Germans happy.
One issue that caused growing tensions among governmental
officials was over developing a standardized military tank.
Though the two countries did finally decide on some common
components, 45 both accused the other of unfair competition.
The U.S.S.R. and West Germany continued their onagain-off-again relations.

The former accused certain

members of the latter of undermining relations, though
Brezhnev did make a visit to West Germany.

East German

officials remained undecided over West Germany.

Their new

five year plan did not include any references to
unification, but did envision normal relations.
with France continued to be apprehensive.

Relations

Schmidt and

d'Estaing met to discuss West Germany's industrial base,

45 The U.S. was to use West German guns, and West
Germany was to use U.S. engines.
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which d'Estaing felt was very strong.

But, Schmidt further

strained relations by saying he was worried about growing
communist influences within France.

d'Estaing, in possible

retaliation, said that France must build its military to
counter both the u.s.s.R. and West Germany.

Finally, China

stepped up its relations with West Germany by increasing
trade to $725 million, and backing a unified Western Europe
to balance the u.s.S.R. 46
Military Activities
Being the NATO border country meant that military
activity would be a large part of the West German political
and social landscape during the three years under study.
Activity in this area was so pervasive that at times it
seemed much more important than reunification or detente.
West Germany stressed NATO and EC solidarity, and in 1974
both Brandt and Schmidt were adamant about NATO forces in
West Germany.

West German officials at one point even

traveled to the U.S. to discuss measures for reviving NATO
forces and morale.

Agreements were made between West

Germany, the U.S., and Canada to pursue common components
for military weapons in a move to standardize NATO forces.
These three countries also had 41,000 troops participating
in joint military activities in West Germany as a show of
strength and solidarity.

The only negative was that U.S.

46 There was other West German foreign relation action,
though most of it consisted of a meeting (Great Britian) or
a couple of statments (Angola).
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troops stationed in West Germany were criticized for being
in the wrong place.

West Germans felt that these troops

had not adjusted to new Warsaw Pact capabilities that had
changed invasion tactics and routes.
In 1975, West German military leaders became anxious
after Warsaw naval activity in the Western Baltic Sea
increased.

Plus, they were concerned with the strength and

stability of Turkey, and met with Turkish officials to
discuss their worries.

Portugal's seemingly turn towards

communism also put West German leaders on edge, as did
talks from the U.S. over reduction of nuclear missiles and
a forty-six percent drop in exports (nation-wide) to the
U.S.

This latter issue was the start of talks over a

possible economic recession in the U.S. and what that would
mean to West Germany's capability to defend itself in case
of an attack.

This led Schmidt to confer with U.S.

President Gerald Ford about NATO economic unity.

West

Germany made a $32.3 million weapons purchase from the
as well.

u.s

Additionly, West German officials were worried

about possible U.S. troop withdrawals, though this did not
happen.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. sent a brigade to

the North German plain to take up a permanent position.
Not all West Germans were happy with this, as 15,000 signed
a protest petition.

Contentions began to run high

concerning NATO weapons standardization.

West German

officials accused U.S. officials of preventing open
competition between military tank manufactures from the two
countries.
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West German officials got little relief in 1976.

They

were still weary of the Warsaw Pact countries, though they
did feel that NATO could match this power. 47 West Germany
continued to buy weapons from the U.S., spending $43
million on U.S. military hardware.

Though they were

willing to pay this amount, they did balk at the prospect
of buying $2.44 billion AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control
system).

Also, when the Warsaw Pact countries forwarded a

proposal to mutually defer the first use of nuclear weapons
and put a freeze on memberships into both pacts, West
German officials opposed it.
Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment
Due to the strong ties between politics and labor
within West Germany, it was difficult to separate the two
areas (as can be seen by the discussion under the political
subheading).
key points.

At this point, I just want to reiterate a few
First, support for the codetermination bill

was given by both workers and governmental leaders, but
opposed by business leaders (both domestic and foreign).
Plus, possibly to appease some of the business leaders,
more managers were to take part in the boards created by
the bill (this move was opposed by labor groups).
Secondly, remember that unemployment was rising at this

47 This may have been based on the assumption that if
war did break out between the two blocs, that there was
enough firepower on each side that both would be
eliminated.
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time -- something that West German workers had not
experienced since the end of WWII.

Finally, one of

Schmidt's main re-election platforms was for safe, clean,
humane working conditions.
Quantitative Data
TABLES XIII, XIV, and XV contain the quantitative data
for West Germany.
TABLE XIII
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA, WEST GERMANY 1972-1976 48
Year

GNP (millions U.S.$) GNP per capita (U.S.$)

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

208,970
329,670
389,760
412,480
461,810

3,390
5,320
6,280
6,670
7,510
TABLE XIV

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, WEST GERMANY 1972-1976 49
Year

Unemployment rates

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

0.7
0.7
1.6
3.4
3.4

48
49

source, World Bank Atlas. 1974-1978.
source, Kearl (op. cit.)
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TABLE XV

Year

STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES, WEST GERMANY 1974-1976 50
51
# of strikes (betroffene betriebe)
890
201
950

1974
1975
1976

Hypotheses, Predictions, and Data for West German Managers
I now move to my supporting hypotheses.
• The first (national leaders) would predict workers
expressing positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
Though not all West German leaders pursued greater foreign
relations, the overall policy of Ostpolitik of both
Chancellors was pursued by most West German leaders.

If

workers saw these leaders as representing West Germany,
then they would be behind this policy as well.
• The second supporting hypothesis (military
intervention) is complicated in West Germany.

Though no

overt military action was taken by the West German
military, there was definitely a foreign military presence
at all times.

Not only was a large (and growing) U.S.

military contingent stationed in West Germany, there was
also the fact that their closest neighbors to the east were
Warsaw Pact countries.

One would be hard pressed to say

50 source, Arbeits-Und Sozialstatistik (1978).
51 These numbers should be qualified. West German
strike activity was actually low compared with other
industrial nations. The numbers reflect not only actual
strikes, but also worker grievances that did not end in
actual strikes.
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that these factors would play no part in the attitudes of
West Germans, so I would have to say that this would make
West German workers anxious, and, therefore, espouse
negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs.
• The third supporting hypothesis (worker unrest and
strikes) would have workers expressing negative attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs (the only year that had less than
500 strikes was 1975).

Remember, strike activity (as we

know it in the U.S.) may not be accurately reflected in
these numbers.
• The fourth supporting hypothesis (GNP) would put
workers in a positive mood toward foreign-owned MNCs, as
GNP rose each of the five years.
• The fifth hypothesis (GNP per capita) would predict
positive attitudes as well, as GNP per capita kept pace
with GNP.
• The sixth supporting hypothesis (unemployment)
would not predict positive attitudes, as the unemployment
level each year was under six percent.

This should be

qualified, though, since the rates of unemployment were
growing (at least in 1974 and 1975).

Unemployment was also

a major factor in elections during the years under study,
so it could be said that though unemployment did not go
over six percent, workers were worried about the prospects
of unemployment -- foreign-owned MNCs may have been
offering jobs.
Combining the six supporting hypotheses gives a
complex picture of possible attitudes.

Though the overall
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foreign policy of West German leaders was one of openness,
the military activity happening in and around West Germany
could not have been ignored.

And, though GNP and GNP per

capita were rising, so was unemployment.

Strike activity

was high, but at the same time lower than other industrial
countries.
This complexity showed in Sauvant and Mennis' study.
Sauvant and Mennis did not study blue collar workers (as
did Marton and Blake and Driscoll).

Instead, they

distributed questionnaires to 3,300 low-level managers and
other white collar workers employed within foreign-owned
MNCs operating in West Germany, West German-based MNCs, and
businesses operating in West Germany only.

They did not

specf ically ask these workers if they were for or against
foreign investments, but instead tried to discern whether
the workers in the different types of companies were
ethnocentric or internationally focused, and if there was a
significant difference between the groups.

Questions

pertaining to such issues as affiliate orientation (who
should control MNC affiliates), EC goals of integration
(including possible personal financial sacrificies to
achieve integration), and the attitudes toward foreign
workers were posed to the respondents.

None of the

statistical findings were significant when workers from the
different categories were compared to each other.
These findings led Sauvant and Mennis to conclude that
employment within MNCs had no effect on workers, though I
think this may not be correct.

It may be that they found
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no effect in West German workers, because of the national
context within which these people lived.

It may be that

white collar workers are less inclined to be affected by
whom they work for than are blue collar workers.
even be a combination of these.

It may

This is based on the

survey reported in Chapter II, in which U.S. non-elites and
elites differed on their attitudes toward foreign
investment.

I do not think that all the workers surveyed

would be considered part of the West German elite, so this
possibility is minimal.

It is more likely that there was a

national variable that was unaccounted for within the
Sauvant and Mennis study.
POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES
Before moving on to my conclusions, I think it is
imperative that I discuss some possible shortfalls of this
study.

First of all, the choices of possible independent

variables to study in this area are almost endless.

The

six chosen, as mentioned in Chapter IV, were ones that I
felt would have an impact on the working class of a
country.

Other possible variables include export-import

balances, value-added averages in MNCs, population growth,
GNP of neighboring countries, type of government in the
countries under study, wage differentials between MNCs and
non-MNC firms. 52 The list goes on, and each variable could

52 oue to time restraints, I was not able to gather
data on wages in the specific firms that were studied. It
has been shown, though, that the average foreign-owned MNC
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probably explain some of the variance within and between
the studies, but a line has to be drawn at some point.
Though I chose my line carefully, that is no guarantee that
it was drawn in the right place.
A second possible discrepancy is the fact that the
same questionnaire was not used with each group of
subjects.

Though each questionnaire was tested for

validity and reliability by those administering the
questionnaires and interviews, this does not mean that they
each measure the same attitudes in the same way.
A third possible shortcoming is that the West German
study was done across industrial sectors, while the
Canadian and Brazilian studies were done in specific
sectors (the former in a specific plant).

It may be that

if all sectors had been studied in each case there would be
an 'averaging' influence.

It was noted in Chapter III that

not all workers are going to have the same attitudes toward
work because of the nature of their work.

It is possible

that if the studies in Canada and Brazil had been coupled
with questionnaires from the service sector (banking, real
estate, etc.), then there would be greater differences (and
so an 'averaging' of attitudes) between workers.

This may

wage is higher than home-based firms, though this may not
be a significant difference (see Chapter II above, and
Caves, 1982 [esp. pg. 151-153], though see Banaji and
Hensman (1990) for an example of wage differences between
home and foreign affiliates of the same companies [TABLE
3.4, pg. 73]).
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be true in the case of Canada, 53 but hard to visualize in
Brazil.

The workers questioned were employed within

paper/pulp mills, but still found pollution not be a
problem.

It seems that foreign investment was so welcomed

in Brazil that workers within any sector would have viewed
it positively.
Finally, though causal linkages were sought and the
possibilities of such linkages discussed, the methodology
used in this study does not give sufficient evidence to
discern specific causal chains.

The above data analysis is

meant to give plausible agruments for the possibility of
linakges between societal factors and workers' attitudes
toward foreign-owned MNCs.

Participant observations and

quantitative tests (more interviews and questionnaires
administered at neutral sites) are needed to supplement the
findings found within the body of this text.

I do not see

this study as a finished piece, but as a gateway to a
better understanding of societal influences on foreignowned MNC workers.

53 Though it should be noted that many in Canada were
trying to keep foreign investment out of the service sector
(see the discussion under Canadian Politics above).

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
MNCs are human institutions.
managed, and carried on by humans.

They are started,
Like all human

institutions, they are more than just the sum of their
parts.

For this reason, it is only the myopic

researcher(s) who says that those working within such
institutions will not be affected. Unless the workers are
robots, 1 they will be affected in some way, whether this is
an entrenching of nationalistic pride or an acceptance of a
foreign presence.

Which will happen will depend largely on

the culture in which the workers live.
not static or ahistorical.

These cultures are

As Peter M. Senge said, when we

break our society into pieces " ••• we lose our intrinsic
sense of connection to a larger whole," and cannot
"reassemble the fragments •••• " (1990, pg. 3).

To

understand MNC workers and predict their attitudes toward
their working environments, we must take into account
societal aspects such as those investigated within this

1 It may be that they do not know their company is
foreign-owned. This type of scenario is definitely worth
studying -- why are they not aware of the nationality of
their employer? Is it ignorance on part of the worker(s),
or a hidden agenda on the part of the foreign owner(s)?
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study.

Workers are not just employed;

they have families,

life histories, educations, friends, coworkers, national
leaders, financial situations, favorite radio and/or
television programs.

In other words, they live within

communities -- within society.

And like institutions,

society is more than the sum of its parts.

This should be

made clear by the different findings of the researchers
reported within this paper.

There was one business

practice investigated -- foreign-owned MNC -- in three
different countries, with the result being that a majority
of the workers in each group espoused an attitude towards
MNCs that was different than the other groups.

(A majority

of the Canadian workers were opposed to foreign-owned MNCs,
a majority of the Brazilian workers were in favor of
foreign-owned MNCs, and a majority of the West German
managers showed little or no preference between foreignowned MNCs, domestic-owned MNCs, and West German-only
businesses.)
This brings me to my main hypothesis, which stated
that if a person is employed within a foreign-owned MNC,
then he/she will have a positive attitude towards foreignowned MNCs.

This is obviously false since a majority of

the Canadian workers were opposed to foreign investment.
What does this mean for the MNC effect, if it exists?
First of all, I do think it exists.

Very few people

working within this environment can be unaffected -- work
is too important to people's lives. Secondly, I think that
the MNC effect is exacerbated by societal factors (and

~
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versa), one of the strongest being nationalism with
national leaders' statements and military activities being
strong candidates for possible predictors of overall
nationalism within a country.

Other societal factors, such

as unemployment rates, strike activity, and overall
economic strength of a country will also play a role in
shaping the workers' attitudes.

This explains the

different attitudes of the workers in the different
countries -- each population had experienced different
societal circumstances.
Let me now turn to sociological theory.

I have

already discussed the strengths and weaknesses of
sociobiology and exchange theory (Chapter II), and rejected
both in favor of social identity in which to approach and
predict the attitudes of the MNC workers.

Though I chose

the social identity approach as the best theory in which to
ground the predictions, other sociological theories are
relevant and precursors to social identity.

This approach

has borrowed material from both functionalism and conflict
theory.

I will briefly discuss the contributions of these

two theories to social identity and the study of MNC
workers.
As I noted in the second chapter, social identity
theory is based on the idea that individuals seek out group
labels that they feel would give them a positive self
identification.

This takes as given that society is

structured in social categories, and that the labeling of
the different groups serves the function of ordering a
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potentially chaotic social world.

By studying the workers

within a social and cultural system, social identity is
also seeing these latter systems as functioning to
internalize values and beliefs within the workers.

This is

obviously borrowed from functionalism -- mainly Parsons'
work on integration among systems of action.
Functionalists would also point to the foreign-owned MNCs
in Brazil as examples of functional economic integration;
not only were the foreign-owned MNCs welcomed by the
majority of the MNC workers, these firms brought jobs and
economic strength to Brazil, and furthered global economic
integration.

Since economic integration is an essential

element of society to most functionalists, this is a strong
argument for using functionalism to predict the course of
workers' overt reaction to foreign-owned MNCs.
Functionalism, though, cannot easily predict which
group label(s) is going to provide positive self
identification, especially when more than one strong label
(such as nationalism and working class) are in contention.
Since many labels and, therefore, groups are in contention
within society, 2 social identity borrows heavily from the
conflict perspective, more so than from functionalism (Hogg
and Abrams, 1988).

It is important to keep in mind that,

according to social identity theorists, social categories

2Not all groups are opposed to each other, though the
thread that holds them together is (usually) rather weak.
Cooperation between groups is as important to the study of
groups as is hostilities.
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are not in harmony, but divided by deep differences in
values and beliefs.

The groups falling within the

different categories will, in many cases, see the other
groups as obstacles to obtaining positive identifications.
For example, in the Canadian study a majority of the MNC
workers had negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs, a
fundamentally opposed viewpoint to that of their employer.
Even groups within Brazil were experiencing conflicts, such
as that

between the Catholic Church and the Brazilian

government over the treatment of the indigenous population
living within the rain forests.
other circumstances as well.

This can be generalized to

A nationalistic worker in a

foreign-owned weapons manufacturing company may be very
unhappy with the foreign investment (or any type of company
that is foreign-owned).

Of course if jobs are scarce, or

the worker is a strong international union advocate, the
attitude towards foreign-owned MNCs may change.

Would the

opportunity of employment be enough to change the mind of
the nationalistic worker, or, for the latter individual,
will the foreign firm be seen as an opportunity to begin to
network internationally with fellow workers?

Social

identity is a better predictor of actual attitudes (which
will be explained further below), while conflict theory
would predict the course the workers would take in dealing
with the presence of foreign-owned MNCs.
Conflict theory and functionalism are both macro
theories, and so do not adequately explain microprocesses.
Social identity theory is flexible enough to take into
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Social identity theory is flexible enough to take into
account both historical and immediacy effects, and looks
for explanations of group label choices through the group
within the individual making it more than a micro theory. 3
This also alleviates the problem of tautology.

Social

psychological theories (and other microsociological
theories) have been marked as tautological by some
Turner, 1987).

(~

These critics would ask whether the group

label has been chosen because it is good, or whether the
group label is good because it has been chosen.

Using

social identity theory, I would say it is most often the
former, though there is a dialectic between the two forces.
Let me return to the MNC workers.

Workers are going to

fall somewhere on the continuum of either welcoming or
despising the foreign-owned MNC.

Their placement on this

continuum will be welcomed by others who share the same (or
close to the same) attitudes, but unwelcomed by those who
have opposing attitudes.

In other words, a person's (or

group's) attitudes will always be opposed by another person
(or group).

The stance (label) chosen was done because it

was seen as offering a positive self identification.

Group

labels are most often chosen for their positive self

3This is not to contradict the above statement that
conflict theory could be a better predictor of an ingroups' reaction to an out-group(s). What social identity
theory could be used to predict beyond microprocesses is
the possible out-groups targetted for hostilities (these
would not have to be overt hostilities, but could be
nothing more than verbal assaults within the in-group.
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identification, not that they are good because they are
chosen. 4 This gives social identity theory -- when
combined with sociohistorical factors

a strong

predictive ability that does not have to be relegated to
individuals.
To move beyond the microprocesses of social identity
theory takes only the knowledge that humans are social
animals.

Groups that fail to attract new members (for
whatever reason) 5 will become nonexistent (~ American
Party), while others that gain new members 6 may grow
extremely large

(~Christianity).

This ability to

explain both micro- and macroprocesses makes social
identity theory a theoretical approach that needs to be
intensively studied and tested, especially when used in

4This is not to say that some people choose labels
because they want to be part of the in-group. Music and
fashion fads ("pop" fads) are a good example of this. Many
people will listen to a certain style of music or wear a
certain style of clothes to feel like they are part of some
group. What needs to be pointed out here is that the music
and other fads are not the primary labels; the primary
label is to be part of a certain group.
5There could be many reasons for a group to fail to
attract new members, such as being overly secretive or such
an anomaly that very few people are interested in becoming
a member. It may be that cases of the former could have
given many people the possibility of positive self
identification, but that the founding members were so
protective of their group that they let no one else join.
Small membership in such 9roups should not be seen as a
rejection of social identification theory, but as an
example of why freeze-frame studies need to be accepted
with careful regard.
6Gains can be made from recruitment or an "open-door"
policy for new members.
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combination with conflict theory.

There are many

institutions which can be investigated.

The MNC is just

one type of empirical institution which lends itself to the
testing of social identity.

More research needs to be done

on attitudes before employment begins, and how these
attitudes may change during employment.

Also, studies need

to be done on the steps taken to accommodate the MNCs or
the negative attitudes toward the MNCs (is there a workers'
backlash against the MNCs -- are strikes at MNCs more
violent than strikes at other companies -- or are they
finding positive identifications somewhere else?).

In

other groups, such as gangs, social identity could be
tested by gathering information on why the members joined
the gang (and why they continue to be a part or drop out).
If "gang" status is unfulfilling to the members, yet they
continue to be members, then social identity should be
replaced by another theory, such as exchange theory if the
members are only staying in to reap capital rewards. 7
Finally, I would like to return to the MNC one last
time.

I started this paper with a statement about the

world shrinking and expanding at the same time.

To become

a truly global community, we must stop the expansions.

7This finding, though, would be problematic. If the
capital rewards were the basis for positive self
identification, then membership could be explained by
social identity -- the capital rewards (and the symbols
these bought) were more important to the positive self
identity than the gang membership was to the negative self
identity.
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MNCs may be a key to furthering the understanding of
different cultures, and, therefore, a key to a more
peaceful global community.

But, we must begin to

investigate the processes of social distance and
nationalism within the MNCs with more attention paid to
spatial and temporal factors within society.

Sociology and

other social sciences must move beyond freeze-frame
investigations, though this does not mean we have to go
back to the origin of man for every study (which would be
ludicrous).

What needs to be done is to gain a more

thorough understanding of the background of present human
interaction and action.

As it has been said, the best

predictor of what happens today is what happened yesterday.
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